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I. INTRODUCTION
There have been several decades of experience with the
system of exclusive representation by majority rule in the private sector under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 1
In addition, a number of states have recently adopted public
sector collective bargaining legislation largely modeled on the
federal Act. A question common to both the private and public
environments concerns the limits that should be imposed on
the terms of the collective bargain.
In the private sector, the primary goal is facilitation of collective bargaining.:2 A vexing problem results from the tension
between the statutory system of private ordering by majority
rule, a system that precludes government from setting the
terms of the collective agreement, and the need to impose an
external limit on the resulting bargain in order to protect individuals and minorities from abuses of majority power. Traditionally, the most important limit has been found in the
judicially created duty of fair representation, although Congress has increasingly enacted direct limits in the form of
antidiscrimination laws. Part II of this Article explores the conflict between majority rule and minority rights in the private
sector. It examines the various theories of fair representation,
especially the emerging notion that the union adhere to rational decisionmaking processes in the formulation of the collective agreement. It then proposes an approach to fair
representation that candidly recognizes the majoritarian basis
of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the Article suggests some
"rules of thumb" to accommodate the tension between minority rights and majority rule.
In the public sector, the fundamental concern is less with
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
2. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining:Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking,44 Cni. I. REv. 669, 670-71 (1975).

19801

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

the limits that should be imposed upon the political processes
of the employees' representative than with the constitutional
limits that flow simply because of the governmental character
of the employer. Part ]II of this Article explores the confusion
that has attended the advent of collective bargaining in the
public sector, with particular emphasis on requirements of the
first and fourteenth amendments and the contract clause. It
suggests that although the duty of fair representation should be
adopted as a necessary concomitant of collective bargaining in
the public sector, the Constitution should be understood to act
independent of that duty to limit what a governmental employer may accomplish by collective agreement.
II. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A.

THE SYSTEM OF MAJORTY RULE

In Colonial America, the law of the employment relationship developed from the English law of master and servant.
Under the colonial system, labor was afforded many protections. For example, the master was obligated to provide care
for his servants, including medical treatment for injuries sustained while in his employ. In addition, workmen could not be
dismissed without reason. 3 Much of this approach to the employment relationship continued into the nineteenth century.
The rule then was that, unless agreed to the contrary, employment could be terminated only after a period of notice.4 By the
latter part of the century, however, the law had completely
changed. All employment, unless agreed to the contrary, was a
hiring at will; the employer was free to discharge an employee
for arbitrary reasons and without notice 5 The employer was
also free to reduce wage rates or make other changes in terms
and conditions of employment. By continuing in employment,
the employee was assumed to have assented to the change and
therefore to have modified his employment "contract. '6 It was
R. MoRRis, GovERNMENT AND LABOR iN EARLY AMERICA 17-18 (1946).
4. The period of notice was determined by the custom of the trade or by a
standard of reasonableness. The history of the law is reviewed (and criticized)
in Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L REV. 335 (1974).
3.

See also Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L, REV. 481 (1976).
5. For a Marxian analysis of this development, see Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 118 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961);
Green v. Dingman, 234 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1956); Weiss v. Duro Chrome Corp., 207
F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1953); Summers v. Ralston Purina Co., 260 Ala. 166, 69 So. 2d
858 (1954); Hauser v. Watson, 60 A.2d 698 (D.C. 1948).
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within this legal environment that the modern notion of collective bargaining developed.
The keystone of the American system of collective bargaining is exclusive representation by a union selected by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.7 Once a union is
selected, the individual's ability to bargain for himself-usually
more theoretical than real-and the employer's ability to deal
separately with employees are lost. By operation of law, the
agent selected by the majority becomes the representative of
each individual, irrespective of the individual's personal will.
Prior to enactment of the National Labor Relations Act
(and occasionally even after its passage), courts conceived of
the relationship between employee and union as a wholly consensual agency relationship. Accordingly, the terms of such a
"trade agreement" 8 bound the employer with respect to an individual employee only if it was determined that the employee
consented to be bound as, for example, by belonging to the
union or by ratifying the collective agreement. 9 That pre-NLRA
approach, however, is at odds with the statutory system of exclusive representation by majority rule, under which the member and nonmember, the union supporter and the antiunion
dissident, are all bound by the terms of the collective agreement.
The sweep of the principle of majority rule was made clear
by the Supreme Court's 1944 decision in J.. Case Co. v.
NLRB. 10 After enactment of the NLRA in 1935,11 some employers resorted to uniform, individually executed employment con7. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1976), provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ....
For the historical background of the principle of majority rule, see Schreiber,
The Origin of the Majority Rule and the Simultaneous Development of Institutions to Protect the Minority: A Chapter in Early American Labor Law, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 237 (1971). The background of the provision for majority rule
under the Labor Act is discussed in I. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING POLICY (1950).
8. See, e.g., F. SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIEs ON

LABOR LAw 644-71 (1922) (ch. XIII, "Trade Agreements"). See generally Feller,
A GeneralTheory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663,
724-36 (1973) ('The Trade Agreement").
9. See, e.g., Shelley v. Portland Tug & Barge Co., 158 Ore. 377, 76 P.2d 477
(1938); Clark v. Claremont Apartment Hotel Co., 19 Wash. 2d 115, 141 P.2d 403
(1943).
10. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
11. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 TS.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
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tracts that, in return for stated benefits, purported to "Waive"
rights guaranteed by the Act. In National Licorice Co. v.
NLRB, 12 the Court had no difficulty in holding such a "waiver"
of statutory rights ineffective. 13 In JI. Case, however, although
the company had entered into individual one-year written contracts 14 governing wage rates and conditions of employment,
none of the provisions in the form contract were independently
offensive to the Act. The company had merely refused to bargain with the union as to those terms and conditions of employment currently governed by individual contracts. The company
did offer to bargain on matters not so governed and to expand
the bargaining agenda upon the expiration of those contracts.
The Court held that individual contracts of employment
could not bar collective bargaining for employees covered by
them.15 In stating that the "very purpose" of the Act was to
"supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees
with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and
serve the welfare of the group,"' 6 the Court also made it clear
that a majority representative could negotiate terms that de7
prive the individual of an existing contractual advantage.'
12. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
13. See id. at 360-62. See generally Hoeniger, The IndividualEmployment
Contract Under the Wagner Act: I, 10 FoRDHAm L. REv. 14 (1941).
14. One member of the National Labor Relations Board was dubious that a
short form that included no commitment to job security constituted a "contract" at all. J.I. Case Co., 42 N.L!RB. 85, 100-01 (1942) (member Reilly, concur-

ring).
15. 321 U.S. at 339. If the Court had agreed with the company, a more subtie device to combat unionization than that involved in NationalLicorice would
have been permitted. An employer could merely embody its existing wage
rates, rules, and working conditions in a standard form to be executed by his
employees, and refuse to discuss these matters with a union until the contracts
had expired. By that time, the union's strength would probably have been dissipated or sufficient doubt would have been cast on the union's representative
status to warrant a refusal to bargain further until a new representation election.
16. Id. at 338.
17. The Court further explainech
The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspi[A] dvantages to individuals
cion on such individual advantages....
may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as disadvantages....
[I]ncreased compensation, if individually deserved, is often earned at
the cost of breaking down some other standard thought to be for the
welfare of the group, and always creates the suspicion of being paid at
the long-range expense of the group as a whole.
Id. at 338-39.
The late John R. Commons explained how, as a college student earning
money as a printer, he learned the "practice and philosophy" to which the
Court adverts by participating in the printers' practice of auctioning the specially compensated "fat" work among themselves:
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Just as the contractual waiver of statutory rights was ineffective, so too would be any other individual contractual provision
inconsistent with the rules established by the collective agree18
ment.

B.

LIMrrATIONs ON THE SYSTEM OF MAJORITY RULE

The subsumption of individual to collective interests does
not imply that there are no limitations on what the collective
may do. Congress has increasingly placed statutory limits on
employment policy, limits that bind unions as well as employers. Indeed, portions of the NLRA insulate the individual from
the reach of the collective. In addition to explicit statutory protections of minority interests, there are indirect statutory safeguards, the most important of which is the duty of fair
representation.
1.

Explicit Statutory Limitations on Employment Policy

The subject matter of a collective bargain is limited by existing statutes and regulations. Federal law may establish minimum standards, which the parties cannot waive by collective
agreement. Such minimum standards are imposed, for examThe "fat" was the advertising, baseball scores, and anything that paid
more than the regular rate. My first bid on the baseball scores was ten
per cent of my gross receipts on that work. This amount was distributed by the "father" [of the union "chapel"] to the other printers. But
I made several labor-saving, or rather labor-enlarging, devices. I went
to the saloons before working hours and took off the ball-scores which
did not usually get to us from the editorial room before eleven o'clock
at night. So the boys put up a job on me at the next auction. They, too,
thought I was earning too much money and was not a real workingman anyhow. They forced me, by a set-up bidding against me, to put
up my bid to forty-two per cent. This, I found, took all or more of the
fat, and I had my extra saloon-work and overtime ball-scores for nothing. Yet, by this distribution of all the fat in the office, each of us got
one to three dollars per week above our earnings at regular rates.
Thus I learned what was the meaning of collective action in control
of individual action .... To me it has always been something vivid,
even painful; but I learned to look upon it philosophically as the way in
which rights, duties, liberties and exposures are created in the relations of the individual to society. My only rights and liberties in typesetting were created by that little society of printers and had been
administered, since the gilds of the Middle Ages, by the "father of the
chapel."
J. COMMONS,MYSELF 18-19 (1934).
18. As a contemporary observer put it, "[L]ike the legislative branch of
government, effecting changes in the law, the union and the employer, by
changing from time to time the rules governing hours, wages and conditions of
employment, bind the employee to each change effected irrespective of the employee's intent in the matter." Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 CoLum. L. REV. 556, 561 (1945).
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ple, by the Fair Labor Standards Act,19 the Occupational Safety
and Health Act,20 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21
Similarly, the Labor Act itself places a limit on the reach of collective agreements; for example, by proscribing the "hot cargo"
clause, 22 the closed shop, 23 and provisions tying job rights too
closely to organizational affiliation.2 4
More subtle are questions that concern the power of the
collective when confronting rights guaranteed to employees
under section 7 of the Labor Act-the right to form or assist la-

bor organizations, the right to engage in collective bargaining or
other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, and the
right to refrain from any or all of these activities. 25 Collective
rights conferred by the Labor Act, unlike individual rights, can

be waived by the collective. 26 The right to bargain, for example,
is a collective right; there is no doubt that the collective can

prospectively waive its right to prevent unilateral employer

adoption of a term not previously bargained about.27 Similarly,

the waivability of the right to strike 28 is supported by a policy
that favors industrial peace and stability. Nevertheless, some
section 7 rights are individual rather than collective, and there-

fore may not be infringed by collective agreement. Unfortunately, there is often no bright line that distinguishes waivable
collective rights from nonwaivable individual rights. 29
This was the issue in NLRB v. Magnavox,30 in which the
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -17 (1976).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
23. Id. § 158(a) (3).
24. Id. § 158. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
26. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme
Court distinguished title VII rights from collective rights conferred by the Labor Act:
It is true... that a union may waive certain statutory rights related to
collective activity, such as the right to strike.... These rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining
and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union members.
Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground, it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities.
Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
28. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956).
29. See Finkin, The Truncation of Laidlaw Rights by Collective Agreement,
3 INDus. REL. LJ. (1979) (in press). I am indebted to my colleague, Robert
Brousseau, for sharing his thoughts on this subject.
30. 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
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Supreme Court held that the right to distribute literature in the
plant, relevant to the selection or retention of a union, could
not be waived by a collective agreement. The majority concluded that a waiver of the right of dissident employees to circulate literature critical of the incumbent union or its
leadership would permit entrenchment of the incumbent in
contravention of the statutory policy of employee free choice in
selecting a bargaining representative. The dissenting Justices
argued that although the union could not, consistent with section 7, waive the rights of dissidents, it could waive the rights of
its own "supporters."'31 In so arguing, Mr. Justice Stewart
pointed out that presumably no one doubted that the union
could waive its right to distribute its own institutional literature.32 Although the dissent does draw attention to an apparent inconsistency between the majority's rationale and the
result, some members of the bargaining unit would, under the
dissent's reasoning, be bound by the terms of the collective
agreement and others would not; thus, the dissent's reasoning
is inconsistent with the statutory system of exclusive majority
representation. The better view is to consider Magnavox as
holding that the expression, by in-plant dissemination of literature, of opinion concerning the retention or displacement of a
union is an individual right conferred by the Labor Act, a right
that a collective agreement cannot abrogate despite countervailing considerations of industrial stability and irrespective of
whether the individual favors an incumbent.
If this view of Magnavox is sound, the reason must be
found in the policy of the Act. It is possible that the dissemination of spontaneous, supportive and semi-supportive literature,
as well as literature that is blatantly critical, may give the
union a more evenhanded sense of its strengths and weaknesses. Limiting the expression of views at the workplace to
those of one persuasion would skew the impact of such expression. Open, robust debate may conceivably help make the
union more balanced as well as more responsive. Therefore,
implicit in Magnavox is the assumption that employee free
choice in the selection or retention of collective representation
necessitates the freedom to speak out at the workplace on the
merits of an incumbent.
In sum, external law, including relevant portions of the Labor Act, may constrain employment policy. Such provisions
31.
32.

Id. at 327-32.
Id. at 329 n.*.
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are insulated from disposition by a majority. As Magnavox evidences, however, the determination of what rights under the
Labor Act are insulated often involves a choice between conflicting policies in the Act itself. But where employment policy
is unconstrained by external law, the Labor Act requires that
the majority have the exclusive voice in the fashioning of the
rules governing the workplace. As J.I. Case made clear, the Act
necessarily contemplates that the majority may advantage itself at the expense of individuals who might be better off with33
out collectivization.
2.

Statutory Safeguardsfor Minority Interests

In adopting a system of majority rule, Congress did not
"authorize a tyranny of the majority over minority interests. ' 34
In so stating, the Supreme Court adverted to three safeguards
against abuse of majority power, two of which seem of questionable utility. First, the representative's power governs only
a "unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining,"
that is, a "group of employees with a sufficient commonality of
circumstances to ensure against the submergence of a minority
with distinctively different interests in the terms and conditions of their employment. '35 Second, the Landrum-Griffin
Act 36 ensures that minority voices can be heard in union affairs. Finally, the statutory duty of fair representation imposes
a limit on the majority's treatment of individuals and minorities.
The first safeguard would be significant if the bargaining
unit under section 9(a) of the Labor Act 37 actually conformed
to the Court's characterization-that is, if the union were
elected by, negotiated for, and accountable solely to the narrowest group of employees with congruent interests. This characterization, however, is often inaccurate. In reality, a unit
determination reflects, for the most part, the structure of the
employer's business and the wishes of the petitioning labor organization. 38 Moreover, the "appropriate bargaining unit" is
often no more than the district in which the representation
33. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See text accompanying notes
10-18 supra.
34. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,
420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975).
35. Id. (citing Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171 (1971)).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976).
37. Id. § 159(a).
38. See Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Inter-
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election is conducted. The bargaining structure actually
worked out by the union and management may far transcend
the individual election districts in which the union initially
achieved majority status. 39 For example, although the union
may have been elected on a plant-by-plant basis, it may nevertheless conduct negotiations on a company-wide or even a
multi-employer basis. The unit actually represented in bargaining may therefore contain groups with highly divergent, if
not conflicting, interests. 40 Moreover, although Magnavox assures union critics a fair opportunity to campaign against an incumbent or its policies, 4 1 the union and the employer may
bargain to consolidate the election districts,42 thereby insulating the union from the likelihood of being successfully challenged in the larger unit.4 3 Given these realities, it is
questionable that minority interests are routinely afforded any
significant protection by the requirement of an appropriate
unit.
The second safeguard may protect the minority, but only
indirectly. The Landrum-Griffin Act ensures that union members have the right to speak, vote, and participate in the affairs
of the union, subject to such reasonable rules as the union may
adopt.44 If a minority within the union decides to form a caucus to pressure the union to achieve minority goals, the Act ensures that the minority may have a fair opportunity to do so.
The Act, however, does not ensure that the majority will accede, even partially, to minority interests. Moreover, the Act
does not provide for the adoption of any particular process for
the negotiation and ratification of collective agreements. Thus,
unless a union has adopted rules ensuring special participation
by a minority whose interests are being disposed of by collective agreement, there is scant protection under the Landrumests ofIndividual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. J- REV.
897, 898 (1975).
39.

See generally THE STRUCTURE OF CoLLEcTrvE BARGAN'NG (A. Weber

ed. 1961).
40. Even in smaller, more homogeneous units, the union may be compelled to make choices that will inevitably have adverse effects on some individual or group within the units.
41. NLRB v. Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322 (1974). See text accompanying notes
30-32 supra.
42. See, e.g., Chase Brass & Copper Co., 123 N.L.1LB. 1032, 1036 (1959); General Motors Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1220 (1958).
43. The Board's approach has been criticized in Brooks & Thompson,
Multi-Plant Units: The NLRB's Withdrawal of Free Choice, 20 INus. & LAB.
REL. REv. 363 (1967).

44. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1976).
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Griffin Act for the minority when its interests may be most directly affected.4 5 Accordingly, the only direct legal safeguard of
minority interests in a regime of majority rule is the duty of
46
fair representation.

C. THE DuTy OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
1.

IN CONTRACT MAKING

The JudicialRoots and the Searchfor Standards

The duty of fair representation was created in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad,47 a case decided in the same
year as J.1 Case.48 In Steele, the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, in its capacity as the exclusive bargaining agent for the railroad's firemen, negotiated to restrict
and ultimately to exclude black firemen from employment. Inasmuch as the union's authority derived from the Railway Labor Act, the challenge to these racially restrictive provisions
was predicated upon constitutional grounds; the Court, however, obviated the constitutional issue by abstracting from the
45. Bok and Dunlop suggest that internal union politicking, while imperfect, nevertheless does provide a significant protection for minority interests.
D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN CoMMuNrry 114-16 (1970).
46. It ought to be observed that the duty applies only after it has been determined that the matter is properly subject to disposition by the majority.
Outright statutory limits upon the bargain have been noted previously. See
text accompanying notes 19-24 supra. But even though J. I. Case makes plain
that existing contract rights may be negotiable, see text accompanying notes 1618 supra, the Court has implied that some contract rights may be insulated
from the reach of the collective. In Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971), the Court held that the subject of
retirement benefits for retirees was a permissive bargaining subject-that is, a
matter which is not subject to the statutory duty to bargain but about which
the parties may agree to bargain. The Court noted that retirees are not unprotected if a union does bargain with their former employer about existing retirement benefits. In cases where retirement benefits under a separate pension
plan have vested as a matter of contract law, they "may not be altered without
the pensioner's consent." Id. at 181 n.20 (citing Note, Pension Plans and the
Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 909, 916-20 (1970)). It suffices to
say here that inasmuch as collective agreements invariably contemplate periodic renegotiation, antecedent provisions of a collective agreement cannot be
considered to "vest" rights in the sense of totally insulating employees from
subsequent alteration or abrogation. Whether the collective may so reduce or
abrogate is governed by the duty of fair representation.
47. 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). The duty applies under the National Labor
Relations Act as well as under the Railway Labor Act. Syres v. Oil Workers
Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam). Moreover, breach of the duty has
been held to be an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations
Act, remediable through an action before the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 188 (1962), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 1963). For a full discussion of
the Board's role with respect to the duty of fair representation, see Fanning,
The Duty of FairRepresentation, 19 B.C. L. REv. 813, 820-37 (1978).
48. J.L Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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Railway Labor Act a statutory duty of fair representation arrived at only by analogy to the equal protection clause rather
than by constitutional command. 4 9 Relying on J.. Case, the
Court observed that although the union was given the power
"both to create and restrict" rights,5 0 there was also a corresponding obligation to act "without hostile discrimination":
This does not mean that the statutory representative.., is barred
from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some of
the members of the craft represented. Variations in the terms of the
contract based on differences relevant to the authorized purposes of
the contract in conditions to which they are to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the type of work performed, the competence and
skill with which it is performed, are within the scope of the bargaining
representation of a craft,
all of whose members are not identical in
their interest or merit.5 1

Racial discrimination was found not to be based on such "relevant differences," and was thus held to violate the duty of fair
52
representation.
Two aspects of the duty of fair representation concerning,
respectively, the consequences and content of the duty were
discussed in Steele. The Court made it clear that the effect of
finding that a provision of a collective agreement violates the
duty of fair representation is the excision of the offensive
term.5 3 In addition, the Court noted that blacks, who were ineligible for membership in the union, had been given no opportunity to be heard by the union prior to the negotiation of the
collective agreement that discriminated against them. The
Court stated that, when necessary to fulfill the duty to represent "non-union members" fairly in collective bargaining, the
union should give them "notice of and opportunity for hearing
upon its proposed action." 54 This language suggests that the
duty of fair representation might encompass a procedural duty
owed to those otherwise prohibited from participating in the
union's internal decisionmaking processes.
The duty of fair representation in contract making was ex49. "We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests
of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to
give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates." 323 U.S.
at 202.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 203.
52. Id.
53. The Court stated: "No more is the Railroad bound by or entitled to
take the benefit of a contract which the bargaining representative is prohibited
by the statute from making." Id. at 203-04.
54. Id. at 204
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plored more fully in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman.55 In that case,
the union had negotiated a seniority provision under which
preemployment military service was computed as part of company seniority. This provision had the effect of lowering the
seniority rankings of a number of employees who had more
company service than some veterans. In sustaining the provision against a fair representation challenge, the Court emphasized the need for negotiators to exercise discretion and to
make concessions that, in the light of all relevant considerations, they believe would best serve the interests of all:
The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory
bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete
good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of
56
its discretion.

The Court then cataloged, as it had in Steele,5 7 permissible
factors that a union could reasonably take into account in negotiating differential treatment.58 In so doing, it cited a Michigan
case, Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,59
as illustrative of an acceptable differentiation. In Hartley, the
railroad served notice upon the union to renegotiate the rules
governing seniority and employment in light of employee protests that males, who were presumably heads of households,
were being laid off while married women, albeit with greater
seniority, were being retained. At a subsequent union meeting,
the majority approved a policy to dismiss all married women
from employ, subject to exceptions for extenuating circumstances. As a result of this agreement, the plaintiff lost her job.
The Michigan Supreme Court observed that the modification
was not the result of "bad faith, arbitrary action, or fraud. '' 60 In
a time of retrenchment, seniority rules, even if long-standing,
might permissibly be jettisoned in favor of a policy ensuring
55. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
56. Id. at 338.
57. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
58. Seniority rules governing promotions, transfers, layoffs and similar
matters may, in the first instance, revolve around length of competent
service. Variations acceptable in the discretion of bargaining representatives, however, may well include differences based upon such
matters as the unit within which seniority is to be computed, the privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of the work, the time at which
it is done, the fitness, ability or age of the employees, their family responsibilities, injuries received in the course of service, and the time of
labor devoted to related public service, whether civil or military, volun-

tary or involuntary.
Id. at 338-39.
59. 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938).
60. Id. at 207, 277 N.W. at 887.
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that work is distributed among heads of households. The policy adopted-aside from the stereotypical assumption that married women are not heads of households-cannot be said to
have been unreasonable, in light of prevailing economic circumstances. Thus, in evaluating differential treatment, both
the Michigan court in Hartley and the Supreme Court in Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffnan6 l looked to larger social policies to sustain the ground upon which the union acted.
In Humphrey v. Moore,62 a union was presented with the
problem of determining the seniority rights of truck drivers after one trucking company absorbed the business of another
company. Under the collective agreement, such disputes were
to be resolved by a joint board consisting of an equal number of
employer and union representatives from the multi-employer,
multi-local unit. Although the Court chose to treat the question
as one involving the union's responsibility in the administration of the grievance procedure, the case actually concerned
the extension of collective bargaining to an unresolved problem.6 3 The joint board adopted the local's proposal that the two
groups of truck drivers should be dovetailed according to their
respective seniority. Thus, the union took a position adverse to
the interests of those drivers of the acquiring company who
would be disadvantaged by the seniority awarded the acquired
employees. The Court held that there was no breach of the
duty of fair representation:
Conflict between employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would surely
weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.
...
[T] he union took its position honestly, in good faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination.... Inevitably the absorption
would hurt someone. By choosing to integrate seniority lists based
upon length of service at either company, the union acted upon wholly
64

relevant considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors.

These decisions pose a vexing problem. It is difficult to reconcile external review of the terms of the collective agreement,
in order to protect individuals and minorities, with the purpose
of the Labor Act-the establishment of a system of private ordering by majority rule, which system ordinarily excludes gov61. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
62. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
63. For a full discussion of the politics and uses of the Teamsters' "openend grievance procedure," see R. JAMES & E. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS:
A STUDY OF UNION POWER 167-85 (1965) (ch. 11, "Manipulating the Open-End
Grievance Procedure").
64. 375 U.S. at 349-50.
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ernment from setting the terms of the collective agreement. 65
It has been argued, for example, that the allocation of jobs in
merger situations according to the ratio of job opportunities
provided by each respective employer "is the most equitable
and rational standard by which a court can judge the substantive fairness of a merger of seniority lists. 66 The necessary institutional consequence of the argument, however, is that a

court should first determine what fairness requires and compel
the union either to adhere to that or show valid business reasons for deviation. In effect, the argument would narrow the
range of private ordering and eliminate any consideration of
majority rule by having a court dictate the substance of the arrangement. 67 Although there is a general consensus that the
inquiry should be less intense when the terms of a collective
agreement are challenged than when the union's conduct of the
grievance and arbitration procedure is involved,68 the identifi65. If the collective interest is to prevail, individual interest can no
more defeat the power of the exclusive representative to make changes
than individual contracts can defeat the power of the collective representative to negotiate a binding agreement superceding all individual
arrangements in the first place .... Unfettered power in the exclusive
representative to appraise the collective interest is the sine qua non of
its vindication.
Ratner, Some Contemporary Observationson Section 301, 52 GEo. L.J. 260, 26163 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
66. Note, Seniority and Business Mergers: The Union's Duty of FairRepresentation, 35 U. Cm. L REv. 342, 358 (1968).
67. The Fourth Circuit has, in dictum, come close to adopting this view.
See Ekas v. Carling Nat'l Breweries, Inc., 602 F.2d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 1979)
("Since over half of the combined production at the Beltway plant was expected to consist of Dillon Street products, an endtailing provision putting Dillon Street employees after the Beltway employees in seniority would have
been patently unfair.").
68. In practical terms, the union's need for flexibility in negotiating
collective agreements is of a different dimension from its need for flexibility in interpreting and applying collective agreements. The collective agreement is a complex package of provisions and benefits. In
negotiating an agreement, the union must accommodate the overlapping and competing demands of varied interest groups, surrendering or
compromising some demands to achieve others. Relative advantages
and disadvantages of different proposals to the various groups must be
weighed both singly and in combination. The package put together
represents not only a bilateral compromise between the union and the
employer, but also a multilateral compromise among interest groups
within the union.
Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective Agreement:
What Constitutes FairRepresentation?,in THE DuTy OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
60, 64 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977). See also Blumrosen, The Worker and Three
Phasesof Unionism: Administrative and JudicialControl of the Worker-Union
Relationship, 61 MicH. L REV. 1435, 1475-76 (1963); Walther, The Board's Place
at the BargainingTable, 28 LAB. L.J. 131, 136 (1977). But see Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement and the Duty of FairRepresentation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052, 1069
(1963).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64.183

cation of suitable standards to refine the duty of fair represen69
tation in contract making continues to prove troublesome.
2. Three Approaches to FairRepresentationin Contract
Making
In addition to the elemental notion of good faith, two generalized theories of fair representation have been offered. Under
the first theory, the union is considered a "fiduciary" for those
it represents. The second theory is framed in terms of procedural fairness. After examining these theories, this Article proposes a more particularized, functional approach.
a. The Theory of Fiduciary Responsibility
A separate taproot of the duty of fair representation is derived from analogy to the law of agency.70 As the Court observed in Steele, "It is a principle of general application that
the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the
69. Because the Steele Court proceeded by analogy to the Constitution, the
equal protection clause has been suggested as one source of guidance. Note,

Duty of Union to Minority Groups in the BargainingUnit, 65 HAnv. L REV. 490,
491-92 (1952). However, it has been argued that the use of the constitutional
analogy is misleading because it unduly accords collective agreements the
same presumptive weight as acts of the legislature. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: FederalResponsibility in a FederalSystem, 67

YALE L.J. 1327, 1339-40 (1958). In any event, it has been suggested that the analogy of the bargaining agent to the legislature cannot be pressed very far. See
Schatzki, supra note 38, at 902.
Other suggested sources of standards include collective bargaining and industrial practice, the expectations of employees, and the moral precepts of the
community and the industrial world. Cox, The Duty of FairRepresentation, 2
Vni. L REv. 151, 168 (1957). It has been argued, however, that the duty of fair
representation in contract making "should allow the union, in good faith, to negotiate changes in conditions of employment as to all matters except seniority
rights." Blumrosen, supra note 68, at 1482. By this analysis, the good faith test
would satisfy the duty of fair representation in the making of collective agreements for all employee interests other than seniority rights, the moral precepts
of the community and the degree of contrary employee expectation notwithstanding. Even scrutiny of the "expectations of the employee community,"
Wellington, supra, at 1357-61, is troublesome, at least insofar as it rests on collective bargaining practice in the industry. Consideration of industrial practice
is, necessarily, a significant element in developing a body of law sensitive to the
system of collective bargaining. Where a bargaining agent departs from the
"moral standards of the industrial world," Cox, supra, at 168, a clear-cut case of
breach of the duty of fair representation would surely be presented. However,
to allow a finding of breach of the duty only where there is a departure from
industrial practice would undermine the notion that the duty is an external
limit imposed upon the system of majority rule. An excess of the system of
majority rule is no less an excess just because it is widely practiced.
70. Summers, supra note 68, at 61.
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power in their interest and behalf .... ,"7- Courts have frequently referred to the "fiduciary" nature of the union's
respon72
sibility toward all members of the unit it represents.
A union is, however, an odd type of fiduciary. Judge
Leventhal recently compared the union's responsibility to that
73
of a "parent who must resolve a quarrel between brothers.
Like the parent, the union does not derive its authority from
the personal consent of each of those who are governed by its
decisions. Also, like the parent, the union must decide what is
best for the entire unit despite conflicts between individuals in
the unit. Unlike the parent, however, the union is a candidly
majoritarian political body that may provide advantages for the
majority at the expense of a minority for no reason other than
4
the majority's desire to do so.7

The practical difficulty with the theory of the union as a
fiduciary lies in the very amorphousness of that standard. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, "[T]o say that a-man is a
fiduciary only begins analysis ... ."75 The fiduciary theory
may supply a tone with which to approach fair representation
questions, 76 but it does not provide a workable standard.
b. The Theory of a Rational Decisionmaking Process
One commentator has argued that the purpose of the duty
of fair representation is to compensate employees for their
71. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
72. See, e.g., Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2238, 2246
(8th Cir. 1979) ('The union is the agent of all employees in the unit and owes a
fiduciary duty to represent their interests .... "); Deboles v. TWA, 552 F.2d
1005, 1014 (3d Cir. 1977) ('"Thus, seniority differences disadvantageous to a segment of a collective bargaining unit have been upheld... where the distinctions were found to fall within the range of reasonableness which governs the
union's fiduciary responsibility to its members.") (citations omitted); Waiters
Local 781 v. Hotel Ass'n, 498 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ('"The fiduciary principle precludes arbitrary conduct .... ").
73. Waiters Local 781 v. Hotel Ass'n, 498 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
74. One court has suggested that a conflict of interest within the union
"dispels [the notion of] a true agency" relationship between the affected members and the union. Nichols v. National Tube Co., 122 F. Supp. 726, 729 (N.D.
Ohio 1954), rev'd sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956). The agency relationship created by
the Labor Act has been read to "repudiate common law agency concepts-to
subordinate individual and group interests within the bargaining unit to the
common interest of the entire class." Ratner, supra note 65, at 264.
75. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943). The difficulties of the
fiduciary concept in the more traditional business setting are discussed in Fiduciary Responsibilities Symposium, 9 Loy. CH. LJ. 525 (1978).
76. See Summers, supra note 68, at 61.
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"lost opportunity to bargain for themselves. ' '77 As a result, the
union must "give fair consideration to minority interests. '78
This standard, the commentator concludes, demands that unions "adhere to rational decisionmaking processes. '79 The Labor Board has reserved the question of "whether to adopt [it]
full-blown. ' 80 The Ninth Circuit, however, has recently adopted
82
this formulation, 81 and the Seventh Circuit has approved it.
Other circuits have declined to construe the duty of fair representation as imposing any particular decisionmaking process
83
upon the union.
The theory of a "rational decisionmaking processes" requirement proceeds from the assumption that existing law, although adequately protective of large factions, is "inadequate
to protect invisible minorities. '84 If the union is required to
give fair consideration to the interests of "invisible minorities,"
however, the union should first be required to ascertain what
those interests are. 85 Accordingly, the theory of a "rational
decisionmaking processes" requirement necessarily imposes
external standards on the union's internal decisionmaking
processes.
The potential reach of this theory is amply illustrated in
the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Branch 6000, National Association of Letter Carriersv. NLRB. 86 This case involved the postal workers' national agreement, which allowed
the union's locals to determine whether the schedule of days
off would be fixed or rotating. A local held a referendum to decide that question and, by a one-vote margin, the membership
indicated a preference for a fixed schedule. The Labor Board
77. Comment, The Duty of FairRepresentation:A TheoreticalStructure, 51
TEx. L. REv. 1119, 1131 (1973).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Rhodes & Jamieson, 217 N.L.R.B. at 618 n.9.
81. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 315 (Rhodes & Jamieson), 545 F.2d
1173 (9th Cir. 1976), enforcing 217 N.L.R.B. 616 (1975).
82. Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976).
83. See, e.g., Waiters Local 781 v. Hotel Ass'n, 498 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
McMullans v. Kansas, Okla. & G. Ry., 229 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 918 (1956). Cf. Confederated Independent Unions v. Rockwell-Standard
Co., 465 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding no statutory obligation to submit contract for membership ratification); Cleveland Orchestra Comm. v. Cleveland
Fed'n of Musicians, 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962) (holding no statutory obligation

to submit contract for membership ratification).
84. Comment, supra note 77, at 1158.
85. This is especially true if the minority is so invisible to the union that it
will not have its distinctive interests represented in the union's decisionmakling
apparatus.
86. 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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held that the failure to include nonunion members in the vote
violated the Labor Act by establishing working conditions in a
manner that encouraged employees to join the union.87 The
court of appeals enforced the Board's order, but based its conclusion on the theory that, because the views of nonmembers
were not reflected in the vote, the referendum procedure
breached the duty of fair representation owed to nonmembers.
The court suggested that, although a union could decide scheduling questions by negotiation and contract ratification that is
limited to union members, 88 a decision by direct referendum
must permit nonmember participation.
To the extent that the decision rests on the formalism of a
referendum, it produces a bizarre result. Under the imposed
remedy, the local must conduct a new referendum of the entire
unit, including nonunion members. Given the almost even division among union members, that term of employment *111 be
determined, in effect, by those who have chosen not to participate in the affairs of the collective representative.
The opinion goes on, however, to speak more broadly in
terms that fully contemplate a judicially imposed special obligation toward some employees who may also be union members.
In most cases a general familiarity with the working environment may

allow a representative of some experience to appreciate adequately the
perspective of all employees. There must be communication access for
employees with a divergent view, although there is no requirement of
formal procedures. Where, as here, it appears to the Board that as a
practical matter one segment of the bargaining unit has been excluded
from89consideration, it may find a breach of the duty of fair representation.

Thus, Branch 6000 holds open the possibility of judicial review
of the adequacy of the union's internal channels of communication to specially situated groups, whether members or nonmembers.
The theory that the duty of fair representation requires
"rational decisionmaking processes" suffers from four infirmities. First, the sole historical support for any procedural com87. Branch 6000, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 232 N.L.R.B. 263 (1977)
(citing Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954)).
88. The court indicated that a system of negotiation and contract ratification, although limited to union members, would still hold open the possibility
that the views of nonmembers could be filtered through the union's decisionmaking process. In such a case, there is a "general presumption ... that the
representative obligation has been performed in good faith." 595 F.2d at 812.
89. Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
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ponent to the duty of fair representation is that set forth in
Steele:
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization

the right to determine eligibility to its membership, it does require the
union, in collective bargaining and in making contracts with the carrier,
to represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without

hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. Wherever

necessary to that end, the union is required to consider requests of

non-union members of the craft and expressions of their views with re-

spect to collective bargaining with the employer and to give to
90 them
notice of and opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action.

The language reflects considerable care in distinguishing the
narrower procedural obligation from the general obligation
owed both to nonmembers and minority union members. It is
apparent that the Court was prepared to impose on the union
special procedural obligations only toward those persons who
were not eligible to participate in the union's internal decisionmaking processes.9 1 Thus, Branch 6000 completely inverts the
logic of Steele. In essence, the District of Columbia Circuit has
held that, by opting out of the channels of communication provided by membership, an individual may trigger a judicially imposed obligation for a union to provide the means of
entertaining his views.
Second, the imposition of a requirement that the union's
channels of communication be fair to "invisible minorities"
who may nevertheless be union members creates the potential
for substantial and essentially unfettered governmental intrusion into the internal processes of labor organizations. Congress has, in fact, considered and rejected a provision that
would produce much the same result. The House version of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 would have
amended the National Labor Relations Act to declare it a basic
employee right "to have the affairs of the [labor] organization
conducted in a manner that is fair to its members and in conformity with the free will of a majority of the members. 9 2 In
opposing the amendment, the minority House report argued
that it would create "an open invitation to complete and unlimited control by the Federal Government of the internal affairs" 93 of labor organizations. The Senate had adopted no
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (emphasis added).
See also pleadings noted in Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968).
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprintedin NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31, 50 (1948)
90.
91.
935, 938
92.

[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HSTORY].
93. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (Minority Report), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 92, at 355, 368.

1980]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

similar provision, and the conference committee deleted the requirement.94 Consequently, it is highly questionable whether
the duty of fair representation should be extended by judicial
action to require a result that Congress has clearly rejected
both in terms and effect.
Third, as a practical matter, contract negotiations are often
conducted on a multi-plant or even a multi-employer basis. As
a result, the collective agreement may affect local customs or
plant practices not known to the negotiators. The imposition of

special obligations on the union to inform itself of such conditions as a part of the duty of fair representation would surely
burden the bargaining process and might inhibit the conduct of
95
industry-wide or multiple-party bargaining.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, fair representation
cases ordinarily result from a union's confrontation with vary-

ing or conflicting interests within the unit. The requirement of
"rational decisionmaking processes," to the extent that it im-

poses an obligation on the union to inform itself fully of the
desires of each individual it represents, would merely clarify

the division and differences that the union is called upon to
reconcile. Furthermore, it would be scant recompense for the
individual's loss of the ability to bargain if a union were free to
disregard his interests after merely providing him with some

opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, there must be a substantive component to the seemingly procedural requirement that
the union "adhere to rational decisionmaking processes.

'96

In

94. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (Conference Report), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 92, at 505, 543-44. The Conference
Committee did approve provisions to create the section 7 right to refrain from
union activity and to make it an unfair labor practice for a union to coerce or
restrain employees in the exercise of section 7 rights.
95. The implications may be illustrated in Brotherhood of Maintenance of
Way Employees v. Butte, A. & Pac. Ry., 201 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mont. 1962). The
carriers and railway unions conducted nationwide, multi-employer, multi-union
bargaining. The resulting agreement provided, inter alia, for life insurance of
$4,000 to be paid by the employers. The employees of one carrier, however, had
long been entitled under Company policy to $6,000 of life insurance and they
sued the carrier to compel it to maintain the antecedent benefit. The court adverted to the case as demonstrating "dangers ... particularly [to] employees,
inherent in the practice of permitting local rates of pay, rules and working conditions to be settled on the basis of national negotiations." Id. at 709. Nevertheless, the court stated that "whether they realized it or not, or whether they
so intended [the unions] have bargained away" the previous insurance package. Id. The case would be extremely troublesome if the duty of fair representation required the union to have informed itself of the effect of acceptance of
the carriers' proposal on these specially situated employees-employees who,
although members, clearly constituted an "invisible minority" in bargaining.
96. Although the Texas Comment suggests that procedural rigor will mini-
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other words, after ascertaining the views of the minority, the
union must either accommodate the minority's interests or sat-

isfy an external tribunal with substantive reasons, irrespective
of union politics, that explain why such minority accommoda-

tion was not reasonable.
This element is reflected in Red Ball Motor Freight.97 In
that case, a company that operated a terminal with fifty employees, represented by the Union of Transportation Employees (UTE), acquired a terminal with thirty employees,
represented by the Teamsters. When the company subsequently announced its intention to close the teamsters' terminal and move all operations to the other terminal, the Board
ordered an election to determine which union would represent
the employees of the merged entity. During the campaign, the
UTE took the position that, if chosen as the bargaining representative, it would not agree to a dovetailing of seniority lists,
as would be the case if the Teamsters won. The Board concluded that this campaign conduct amounted to an announcement of intention to breach the duty of fair representation. The
District of Columbia Circuit agreed:
UTE has renounced any good faith effort to reconcile the interests of
the [two groups]. It raised no questions with respect to the merits of
dovetailing, such as that some jobs are more difficult of execution or require more training than others.... UTE has, in sum, failed to come
forward with any reason at all for preferring the [favored] employees
other than the purely political motive of winning an election by a promise of preferential representation to the numerically larger number of
voters. 8

This reasoning simply ignores both the political nature of
the union 99 and the candidly majoritarian character of collecmize the intensity of judicial review of the substance of the decision, the Comment also recognizes the conundrum: "[I]nstead of reviewing the union's
choice of alternatives for reasonableness or fairness, courts should review the
union's decisionmaking process. If the union gave fair consideration to the
complaining employees' interests and based its decision on rationalfactors,
the court should not interfere." Comment, supra note 77, at 1132 (emphasis added).
97. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB (Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc.), 379
F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Branch 6000, in turn, relied on Red Ball Motor
Freight. See Branch 6000, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d
808, 813 & n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1979); text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
98. Id. at 142-43.
99. On the political nature of the union, Arthur Ross has observed.
A trade union is never a homogeneous group. The ordinary "craft"
union includes a number of skilled occupations as well as apprentice
and helper categories, and the occupational composition of an industrial union, is, of course, even more heterogeneous.... Even within a
single industry, there are the employees of profitable and unprofitable
firms, and the employees residing in high-wage and low-wage areas.
Moreover, there are young and old workers, fast and slow workers,
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tive bargaining. Regarding the latter, the Court in J.. Case
took special note of the "practice and philosophy of collective
bargaining." 10 0 A statement about the practice of collective
bargaining, made roughly contemporaneously with JL. Case,
speaks to the issue in Red Ball Motor Freight:
In many situations the union ranks are split on what kind of seniority
rules should be in force, as one set of workers will get better job protection through departmental seniority, or even job seniority, than
through plant-wide seniority, which another set of men prefers. Here
the rule of the majority is the only solution, for all a union can hope to
do is serve the best interests of the greatest number of its members ....
[O]f necessity, the union's approach to seniority rules is
frankly opportunistic; it is job protection the union members want, and
rules into this desire and not job protection into senthey fit seniority
10 1
iority rules.

The court in Red Ball Motor Freight,however, perceived its institutional role as compelling the union to come to grips with
the problem on the merits irrespective of the desires of the majority. In so doing, the court ignored the teaching of J.I. Case:
it is part-and-parcel of the concept of collective bargaining for a
majority, at times, to benefit itself at the expense of a minority.
The vexing problem, unattended by the Court in Red Ball Momale and female workers, married and single workers, employed and
unemployed workers.
Nonhomogeneity of membership often gives rise to conflicts of interest; it is one of the most delicate political tasks of the union leadership to reconcile these conflicts in formulating its wage program. The
ultimate resolution depends upon (1) the effective political pressure
generated by the various interest groups and (2) the political skill of
e leadership.
A. Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE PoLicy 31-32 (1948). See also A. Weber, Union Decision-Making in Collective Bargaining; A Case Study on the Local Level 149
(Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana
1951), quoted in note 188 infra.
100. J3. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).

101.

C. GOLDEN & H. RUTTENBERG, THE DYNAMcs OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOC127 (1942). A recent illustration is supplied in Butler v. Local 823, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975). The collective agreement provided for dovetailing in cases of merger subject to alteration by the Change of
Operations Committee. The Committee ordered the dovetailing of some of the
acquired employees and the endtailing of others. The representative of the local union testified to the circumstances surrounding the change:
I had quite a lot of trouble with the Yellow Freight drivers * * *. EveryRAcy

body knew that Watson drivers had a lot of seniority, Watson was an
old line * and they didn't want any of them down there. *** [T] hey
felt that they had no reason to be there * * *. And there was a lot of
dissatisfaction amongst the drivers, and well, it got pretty bad. They
was about ready to throw me out of the hall, and the president of our
local, too, because they absolutely didn't want to lose any of their work.
Id. at 453 (omissions are in case report).
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tor Freight, is to provide some means for deciding what those

02
times are.'

In

sum, the theory of a

"rational decisionmaking

processes" requirement rests on the faulty assumption that a
union is comparable to an administrative agency with power to
issue rules governing the workplace. By that analogy, an appropriate judicial function is to ensure the agency's (the
union's) adherence to procedures that maximize the participation of affected groups and to ensure that the resulting rules
are not arbitrary. The assumption, however, is inconsistent
with the Labor Act.
c. A Functional Analysis: Some "Rules of Thumb"
The gravamen of the duty of fair representation in contract
making is the protection of the minority from an abuse of majority power in the context of a system which fully contemplates that the majority may, at times, permissibly advantage
itself at the expense of the minority. The function of the duty
of fair representation is simply to limit how far the majority
may go in advantaging itself at the expense of the minority.
Courts have identified several elements of the duty-to act
without hostility, malice, dishonesty, or bad faith, or upon arbitrary,10 3 irrational, or irrelevant grounds'--and have treated
these elements as uniformly applicable in cases of both con102. In Branch 6000 as well, the court, relying upon Red Ball Motor Freight,
stated.
If a representative's negotiating decisions are motivated solely by selfinterest, then there is a breach of the duty of fair representation. The
same result obtains when the decisionmaking function is delegated to a
group of employees with the understanding that their actions will be
motivated solely by their own personal considerations.
595 F.2d at 812. The court recognized that this was not a situation of members
advantaging themselves at the expense of nonmembers. The defect was entirely procedural. If the court's observation is correct, it should not have made
a difference that nonmembers were excluded from the referendum. Any system of decisionmaking that rests solely upon the sum of individual preferences
will produce a majority and minority. Under the court's reasoning, whatever
result the "swing vote" of nonmembers produced would rest on nothing but the
self-interest of the majority of that group, and so would breach the duty to represent the minority fairly. See also text accompanying note 220 infra.
103. The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have said
that arbitrariness is a distinct element of breach of the duty of fair representation in contract making. Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747 (3d
Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 315, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976); Barton
Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976); Waiters Local 781 v. Hotel
Ass'n, 498 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In 1972, the Second Circuit required
"[s] omething akin to factual malice," Jackson v. TWA, 457 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir.
1972), but later held, without reference to Jackson, that arbitrariness is sufficient to breach the duty. Jones v. TWA, 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974). The
Eighth Circuit, however, seems to have adhered to a test of bad faith or hostil-
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tract negotiation and contract administration. They have done
so because of the language employed by the Supreme Court. 10 5
However, each of the Supreme Court cases treating the duty in
contract negotiation concerned the drawing of a contractual
distinction that advantaged some at the expense of others.
Thus, it remains to be seen whether each element of the duty

of fair representation is necessarily applicable every time the
union acts or declines to act. On the one hand, the proscription
against a union decision based on bad faith or hostility lies at

the core of the duty and should be equally applicable to a refusal to act as to action affirmatively taken. Such a proscription
results in minimal intrusion into the system of collective bar-

gaining and presents little difficulty to the legal process, apart
from the practical problems inherent in any standard requiring
a determination of intent. On the other hand, it is questionable
whether the proscription against arbitrariness or irrationality

should have similar uniform applicability.
The union is a focal point for employee disgruntlement and

aspiration; it must accommodate varying and often conflicting
desires. Although responsible union officials may view some of
ity. Augspurger v.. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.
1975).
104. Note, for example, the prefatory remarks of a district court in a recent
case:
[A] union must conform its behavior to each of three separate standards: first, it must treat all factions and segments of its membership
without hostility or discrimination; next, the broad discretion of the
union . . . must be exercised in complete good faith and honesty;
finally, the union must avoid arbitrary conduct. Each of these requirements represents a distinct and separate obligation ...
Farmer v. Hotel Workers Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M. 2166, 2185 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
The notion that each of these elements "represents a distinct and separate obligation" was stated by Judge Sobeloff in Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th
Cir. 1972), a case concerning the union's handling of the grievance procedure.
The district court above made a wholesale translation of that reasoning into the
negotiation of a collective agreement.
105. In Steele, the Court held that the union is obliged to act "without hostile discrimination." 323 U.S. at 204. The Court also observed, however, that the
union may act upon relevant differences even if the effects upon some are unfavorable. Id. at 203. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan, the test seemed to be "good
faith and honesty of purpose," but the Court stressed as well the "Wide range
of reasonableness" that a bargaining agent must have. 345 U.S. at 338. A "wide
range of reasonableness," as one commentator has noted, implies a correspondingly "narrow margin of intolerable unreasonableness, bringing into the judicial
calculus a different level of consideration than was previously implied in terms
like good faith and honesty." Jones, The Origins of the Concept of the Duty of
FairRepresentation,in THE DuTr OF FAiR REPRESENTATION 25, 34 (J. McKelvey
ed. 1977). The Court in Humphrey v. Moore also spoke in terms of honesty,
"good faith," and "hostility or arbitrary discrimination," but stressed as well
that the union "acted upon wholly relevant considerations." 375 U.S. 350 (1964).
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these complaints and demands as unreasonable or even arbitrary,10 6 the extent to which members or influential groups
tenaciously hold to them is a political fact that the union must
recognize and accommodate.10 7 For this reason, it may not be
appropriate to speak of the "irrationality" or "arbitrariness" of
a collective agreement. 0 8 The white unionists in Steele, 0 9 for
example, were not acting upon an arbitrary factor. They were
acting upon racial assumptions, common to their class and region at the time, which maximized their '"psychic satisfaction"
by maintaining blacks as a permanent underclass." 0 It cannot
106. See, e.g., A. Weber, supra note 99; note 188 infra. As Bok and Dunlop
observe, "Although this [bargaining] process is hardly perfect, it tends, on the
whole, to make union strategy conform to the intensity of feeling among different groups of members and to the relative merits of the claims they have advanced." D. BoK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN CoMNITY 114 (1970).
107. We must begin by reviewing the role of the trade union official. He
is the leader of a political instrumentality which has the same institutional drives as any political instrumentality: survival and growth. To
facilitate the survival and growth of the organization and promote his
personal advancement, he endeavors to reconcile the political pressures which are focused upon him in the bargaining process. These
pressures emanate from the rank and file, from the employers, from
other levels of the organization, from other sectors of the labor movement, and from the government. They must somehow be resolved into
a feasible compromise. This is the job which he is called upon to perform.
A. Ross, supra note 99, at 95.
108. When, therefore, a union behaves as though it had other ends in
view than the maximization of the wage bill, when strikes are resorted
to which by any monetary measure will not be worth their cost, when
some differentials in wages are borne without protest and others occasion bitter attack, when emphasis seems to bear heavily upon the
amount of the increase and less upon the amount of the wage, when
the standardization of rates or of increases is pursued at the expense
of a larger total wage bill, it would be imperceptive and mistaken to lay
these problems to irrationality, shortsightedness, or lack of education.
They have their meaning and their logic.
Id. at 45.
From a managerial perspective, highly restrictive seniority practices may
be considered arbitrary if they are economically inefficient. From a union perspective, the practice may be a policy choice, as for example, to "reduce the
rate of entry of younger men," M. BARATz,THE UNION AND THE COAL INDUSTRY
71 (1955), or as a response to felt need. See, e.g., IL NORTHRUP, RESTRICTIVE LABOR PRACTICES IN THE SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY 81-82 (1967) ("Te loading platforms in a midwestern city were so situated that one sector was particularly
hot and unpleasant in the summer while the others were shaded and cooler
but in winter, the shaded portions were whipped by bitter cold winds. The local Teamsters' bargaining committee, dominated by senior men, demanded
seniority on the basis of platform sectors.").
109. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
110. See H. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO 49-50 (1944):
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century a vigorous
debate on the "Negro question" was waged in the journals of the Firemen and the Trainmen. These Brotherhoods had two possible methods
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be argued that "psychic satisfaction" is irrelevant to the union's
function."' The agreement breached the duty because federal
policy made race a proscribed consideration, even if it otherwise maximized the majority's satisfaction. So, too, in Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman," 2 one would ordinarily have thought
that military service by persons who had not been in the company's previous employ was not especially relevant to the company's seniority system, especially because Congress, in
legislating on the subject, had spoken only to the status of the
returning employee. The union was, however, confronted with
the demands of returning veterans, not previously in the company's employ, who felt that they ought to be treated like those
veterans who had left the company to enter military service.
Thus, the union was asked to reconcile those demands with the
interests of employees who had never been in service." 3 In
contrast to Steele, the distinguishing characteristic was not proscribed by federal law; in fact, the union's solution, which necessarily disadvantaged some, found support in larger social
policy.
In sum, the requirement that a union not act "arbitrarily"
is appropriate in cases of contract administration, where the
union must decide whether to pursue an individual's grievance,
4
but has only limited significance in cases of contract making."
of meeting the competition of the unorganized Negroes. The first, as
some northern member suggested, was to admit the Negroes into their
union and to "teach him and educate him" to present a solid front
against the employer. The second was to force the railroads to eliminate the Negro from train and engine service. The social origins of the
Big Four [railroad brotherhoods] made it almost inevitable that the
second alternative would be chosen.
[T]he Brotherhoods were founded as fraternal and beneficial
[..
societies rather than as trade unions. Much emphasis is still placed on
these social features. To admit Negroes, the southern members declared, would be tantamount to admitting that the Negro is the "social
equal" of the white man. This they refused to countenance.
See also Marshall, The Negro in Southern Unions,in THE NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MovErN
128, 135-36 (J. Jacobson ed. 1968).
111. See Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws
Against Discrimination A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. Cm. L.REV. 817
(1967).
112. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
113. "Widespread dissatisfaction with his lot, arising out of the veteran's
feeling that he had lost out in his competitive status in employment, would
have caused the type of unrest which leads to strikes." Reply Brief on Behalf
of Ford Motor Co., Petitioner, at 21, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953). 'The Union was compelled to decide whether to run the risk of resultant labor unrest and a possible strike or to accord equal treatment to all veterans ... ." Reply Brief on Behalf of Ford Motor Co., Petitioner, at 31.
114. See Leffler, Piercing the Duty of FairRepresentation: The Dichotomy

Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILT_ L.F. 35, 37. This
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In the latter instance, the fair representation question must be
determined by weighing the firmness and significance of the
minority's defeated expectations against the degree of interference with the system of collective bargaining occasioned by the
substitution of an external judgment for that of the union. The
consequences of this view of the duty of fair representation in
contract making are explored in the following propositions.
These propositions are not intended to supply a code; they are
simply rules of thumb that provide a more solid guide to the
contours of the duty of fair representation.
(1) A question of a departurefrom the duty offair representation is not presentedunless there is a disadvantagementof
a minority within the bargainingunit or of an individualwhere
the characteristicof the individual's disadvantagement is not
shared with the majority. Because the gravamen of the duty is
a limitation on the majority's power over the minority, the duty
does not restrain the power of the majority over itself. If, for
example, a union agrees to an across-the-board reduction in
benefits," 5 or fails to secure severance pay in the event of plant
closing," 6 no question of fair representation is presented because the disadvantagement is of the majority (in these examples, the entirety) of the unit.
There are situations, however, in which the effect of apparently uniform treatment falls disproportionately on a minority.
For example, a union might agree to a mandatory retirement
age, which has the effect of summarily displacing employees
beyond that age and curtailing the expectancy of future employment of those nearing the retirement age." 7 Although the
adoption of a mandatory retirement provision will ultimately
affect every unit member, it may well be that the majority composed of relatively young workers would be immediately advantaged by the increased opportunity for movement up the
seniority ladder. This advantage to younger workers would be
commentator, however, apparently sees no role for fair representation in the
regulation of the substance of the union's bargaining position. See note 148 infra.
115. See, e.g., Fogg v. Randolph, 244 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
116. See, e.g., Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 755
(E.D. Mo. 1965), affd, 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957
(1967).
117. See, e.g., Roberts v. Lehigh & N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963);
McMullans v. Kansas, Okla. & G. Ry., 229 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 918 (1956); Goodin v. Clinchfield R.R., 125 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1954),
affd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956).
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at the expense of older workers who fill the senior slots." 8 In
such a case, scrutiny under the duty of fair representation is
appropriate. If, however, the majority can reasonably be categorized as adversely affected by the rule, no question of fair
representation is presented.
(2) A union may not disadvantage a minority or individual out of hostility, malice, bad faith, dishonesty, or any other
proscribedground. Consistent with Steele," 9 it is a fundamental element of the duty that the union may not act or refuse to
act because of malice, hostility, or any ground proscribed by

federal law. The Labor Act, for example, distinguishes between
contractual arrangements that impermissibly tie job rights to
union affiliation 120 and those that are properly supportive of the

union's institutional function. 12 ' A provision improperly tying
job rights to membership would constitute a breach of the
union's duty to represent nonmembers fairly. This distinction
of
might have supplied an arguable ground for finding a breach 122
the duty of fair representation in Red Ball Motor Freight,
which involved a union representation campaign for a merged
bargaining unit. The campaign platform of the union that had
represented the larger of the two groups included a promise to

place the smaller group at the bottom of the merged seniority
list. Such action would have had the ancillary effect of favoring

union members over nonmembers, 12 which effect could supply
a principled basis for finding a breach of the duty of fair representation. 124
118. Note the reasoning in Roberts v. Lehigh &N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219, 223 (3d
Cir. 1963) ("Each lodge consented to the inclusion of the provision in the agreement only after a majority of its members voted in favor of it. The fact that the
provision may favor younger workers who outnumber older ones with greater
seniority rights is not a basis for a claim of hostile discrimination.").
119. Steele v. Louisville &N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.

120. Section 8(b) (1) (A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in their exercise of the section 7 right to support or
to refrain from supporting a union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1976). Section
8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to cause... an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of section 8(a)(3)." Id.
§ 158(b) (2).
121. See, e.g., Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforced, 531 F.2d
1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
122. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
123. This is the sense of Jones v. TWA, 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). It supplies the better view of what was involved in NLRB v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d
122 (6th Cir. 1959), and explains why NLRB v. Whiting Milk Corp., 342 F.2d 8
(1st Cir. 1965) was wrongly decided.
124. Although this would be arguable, it would not be right. If the same
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964125 regulates the substance of employment policy concerning race, sex, religion, and
national origin; as a result, title VII and the duty of fair representation overlap. 126 Under Steele, 127 for example, if it is clear
that the collective agreement intentionally disadvantages a racial minority, the union will have breached the duty of fair representation owed to that group. Title VII, however, goes well
beyond the duty of fair representation. Under title VII, an employer policy (or a provision of a collective agreement) that is
neutral on its face, but has a disproportionate effect upon one
of the classes protected by that Act, constitutes an unlawful
employment practice unless it can be justified by overriding
business necessity; 128 actual intent to discriminate is not a necessary element of a title VII violation. Furthermore, a charge of
a title VII violation may necessitate the analysis of statistical
data 12 9 or expert opinion on the validity of tests for employment and promotion. 30 Some courts have implied that, inasmuch as conduct violative of title VII is necessarily
discriminatory, such conduct also breaches the duty of fair representation when it is undertaken pursuant to provisions of a
collective agreement.' 3 ' Other courts have distinguished the
duty of fair representation as requiring, unlike title VII a showunion in Red Ball Motor Freight had represented both groups and had done
precisely the same thing, it would not, under proposition (6), see p. 222 infra,
have breached the duty, even if its motivation derived solely from the political
power of the numerically larger group. There is no reason why the union
should not have been candid in the election about accomplishing that result.
Indeed, a lack of candor might supply a basis for finding bad faith. See, e.g.,
Teamsters Local 671 (Airborne Freight Corp.), 199 N.L.R.B. 994 (1972), discussed
in note 201 infra.
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -17 (1976).
126. See Hebert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimination,46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449 (1971); Peck, Remedies for Racial Discriminationin Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of
Forums,46 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1971); Sherman, Union's Duty of FairRepresentation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965).
127. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
128. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
129. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). See, e.g.,
Shoben, Differential Pass-FailRates in Employment Testing: StatisticalProof
Under Title VI, 91 HARv. L. REv. 793 (1978).
130. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290, 38,290-309 (1978).
131. See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 795, 819-21
(N.D. Ind. 1977); Stith v. Manor Baking Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 511, 513-14
(W.D. Mo. 1976).
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ing of discriminatory intent. 32
This divergence may not be as wide at it first appears. Intention under the duty of fair representation may be evidenced
by the clarity of the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral
policy, as well as by the circumstances surrounding adoption of
the policy. In the railway litigation following Steele, for example, the union proposed a seemingly neutral and uniform policy: abolishment of the distinction between black firemen, who
were hired and acquired seniority on the basis of their ineligibility for promotion to engineer, and white firemen, who were
hired as promotable to engineer and consequently had to pass
a series of tests or be terminated. The union proposed that this
distinction be abolished by requiring blacks to pass the tests
that were previously required only of whites. Although seemingly nondiscriminatory, the policy would have resulted in the
elimination of black firemen with substantial seniority who
could not pass the tests but who desired to continue as firemen.
The courts had no difficulty holding the proposal violative of
33
the duty of fair representation.
Title VII, however, is intended to effect the larger goal of
eliminating discrimination in employment; toward that end, a
mode of analysis has developed particular to that Act. Accordingly, the function of and the analysis under the duty of fair
representation differs from the function of and the analysis
under title VII once the question of impermissible motive has
been put aside.'3 Title VII necessarily contemplates intense
judicial examination of the content and results of substantially
every detail of employment policy and practice in order to ensure conformity with the social goal set by Congress. Statistics
can play a significant, even dispositive role.135 In contrast, the

duty of fair representation supplies only an outer limit upon a
system of private ordering that ordinarily precludes govern132. See, e.g., Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 405 (7th Cir.
1974); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 373 F. Supp. 885, 905 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
133. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Palmer, 178 F.2d 722 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); Rolax v. Atlanta Coast Line Ry., 91 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1950),
rev'd, 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951). For an account of this litigation and for a
very critical appraisal of the actual impact of the duty of fair representation on
the elimination of racial discrimination, see Herring, The "FairRepresentation"
Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination?,24 MD.
L. REv. 113 (1964).

134. Compare Whitfield v. United Steelworkers, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959) with Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (5th
Cir. 1970).
135. See text accompanying notes 128-129 supra.
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1 36
ment from setting the terms of employment policy.

Accordingly, the better view is to recognize that the duty of
fair representation has a function and analysis independent of
more broadly conceived remedial schemes. Positive law may
now render impermissible distinctions in terms and conditions
of employment directed toward certain groups--distinctions
that had, in the past, been permissible. For example, external

law now declares that women, 137 the elderly, 13 8 and the handicapped, 139 must be specifically protected against some forms of

employment discrimination. It is appropriate, therefore, as in
136. In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979), the Court held
that a collective agreement's affirmative action plan assigning job training on a
one-for-one basis from racially segregated seniority lists did not violate title
VII. The Court did not discuss the question of whether the agreement
breached the duty of fair representation. Although the Court stressed that the
issue before it was purely one of private action, and did "not present an alleged
violation of the Equal Protection Clause," id. at 2726, the result is troublesome
because the duty of fair representation was thought in Steele to draw sustenance from the analogy to the equal protection clause. See note 69 supra; text
accompanying note 49 supra. As a matter of fair representation Weber could,
conceivably, be disposed of under proposition (1), see p. 210 supra, as one of a
majority discriminating against itself. The ancillary disadvantagement of
whites by white-dominated unions has withstood fair representation challenges. In Williams v. Central of Ga. Ry., 178 F. Supp. 248 (M.D. Ga. 1955), a
white fireman who had failed the test for engineer and was thus assigned to
yard duty complained of breach of the duty of fair representation owed to
whites because, under the white union's previous policy discriminating against
blacks, blacks were not required to take the examinations for engineer. The
court found no breach of the duty. See also Whitfield v. United Steelworkers,
263 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1959) ("If there is racial discrimination under the new
contract, it is discrimination in favor of negroes."). From the perspective of
proposition (1), however, the question would turn on whether the "character of
the disadvantagement"--to use the formulation offered here-was race alone or
race plus seniority. All whites were not uniformly disadvantaged; the job training plan disadvantaged only those whites who were interested in training for
craft positions and who would be displaced by the preference for blacks. Accordingly, the appropriate analysis would turn under proposition (6), see p. 222
infra, and proposition (7), see p. 227 infra, on whether a racial distinction is
one relevant to collective bargaining as determined by the sources that inform
that standard, especially in this context, by analogy to the equal protection
clause. The Steele Court, however, applied that analogy and held race per se to
be an irrelevant or. arbitrary distinction. If the plan in Weber is considered to
draw a racially permissible distinction for fair representation purposes, there
would be no escaping the conclusion that the equal protection clause has, by
analogy, assumed an accordion-like quality. See generally Van Alstyne, Rights
of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution,46 U. CHL L. REV.
775 (1979). For a suggestion of how troublesome duty of fair representation issues become once a union is permitted to take account of race, albeit for seemingly benign purposes unrelated to the settlement of a possible title VII
violation, see Rabin, FairRepresentation Constraintsin the Voluntary Elimination of Job Discrimination,5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 337 (1979-1980).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -17 (1976).
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
139. Id. §§ 791, 793-794.
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Steele' 4° and FordMotor Co. v. Huffman,141 to look to larger social policy in order to ascertain whether intentional disadvantagement of such a group also constitutes unfair
representation. Unless the discrimination has been intentional,
however, complainants should be limited to relief under the
relevant remedial scheme. Although it is highly unlikely that
relief for employment discrimination would be sought exclusively under the duty of fair representation, the wholesale assimilation of broader remedial schemes into that duty serves
no practical function and only blurs analysis of a doctrine that
is beclouded enough. 142
(3) A majority may not expropriate a benefit or interest
currently enjoyed by the minority solely to benefit itself. In decisions of some vintage, the courts allowed a majority simply to
expropriate a right or benefit enjoyed by a minority. 143 The
contemporary view is that such an expropriation-a taking of
an existing right or interest solely to advantage the majoritysimply goes too far. This principle was presaged in an early
Wisconsin case' 44 in which, prior to unionization, a streetcar
company and a bus company merged and established a joint
seniority list. A decade later, the union, dominated by former
streetcar operators, negotiated to alter the seniority list to their
benefit. Although the court contemplated that seniority rights,
once established, become "vested" and consequently cannot be
altered in the absence of changed economic circumstances, the
case is more properly read today for the proposition that seniority rights, once established, cannot be expropriated simply
140. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
141. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
142. One observer has argued that the enactment of separate measures to

combat racial discrimination is all for the good:
Without the background of employment discrimination matters,.., it
is easier to probe the duty of fair representation as that of a trustee
charged with the welfare of his wards, rather than as a constitutional
shield against deliberate, invidious abuse by the bargaining representative of some of the persons committed to its charge.
Jones, The Origin of the Concept of the Duty of Fair Representation, in ThE

DuTy OF FAir REPRESENTATION 25, 35 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977).
143. See, e.g., Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 820 (1950); Jennings v. Jennings, 91 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949). But
see Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 68 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
These cases were strongly criticized by Professors Cox, supra note 69, at 162-63,
165-66, and Wellington, supra note 69, at 1339-41.
144. Belanger v. Local 1128, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Ry. &Mo-

tor Coach Employees, 254 Wisc. 344, 36 N.W.2d 414 (1949).
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for the benefit of the majority. 145
This contemporary view is reflected in Barton Brands,Ltd.
v. NLRB. 1 46 The merger of two companies resulted in the closing of one plant, and the employees in the two units, who were
represented by the same union, voted separately to dovetail the
seniority list. Although at the time the vote was taken it was
assumed that a new facility would open, the employer subsequently abandoned that plan. As a result, the union negotiated
to change the seniority list to endtail the minority of employees
from the acquired company. Although under Humphrey v.
Moore' 47 the union could have endtailed the acquired employees initially, the majority could not, solely in order to benefit itself, expropriate the seniority it had previously accorded.
It could be argued that employees' expectations must take
into account the union's ability to readjust seniority whenever
changed economic assumptions threaten the majority's security. In Barton Brands, the seniority rule was altered to favor
the majority because of a change in the economic assumptions
upon which the original decision was made-that is, the abandonment of plans for a new facility that would have provided
sufficient jobs for all. The purpose of a seniority system, however, is to provide employees with a predictable basis for gauging their relative job security. Consequently, the system's
value to employees is especially significant in a time of economic recession. In terms of the balance described earlier, the
expropriation of seniority in Barton Brands constitutes a violation of the duty of fair representation: the minority's interests
are substantial, the majority's action simply too blatant, and
the remedy fashioned works only a minor disruption in the system of private ordering. 14 8
145. See also Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp. 3
(D.D.C. 1953); Local 4076, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers, 338 F.
Supp. 1154 (W.D. Pa. 1972), discussed in text accompanying note 185 infra.
146. 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976).
147. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
148. One commentator has recently argued that the sole concern of the duty
of fair representation in contract negotiation is the union's subjective motive;
that is, the issue is whether the union is acting in good faith, with an honest
purpose, and with a lack of hostility. Leffier, supra note 114, at 40. From that
perspective, it is argued that Barton Brands was wrongly decided. Id. at 47-49.

It suffices to say that that theory draws no support from the law of fair representation. Under that theory, there would have been no breach of the duty of
fair representation in Steele, see text accompanying notes 47-54 supra, had the
union proved that it adopted the racial distinction not out of malice or hostility,
but for the honest purpose of accommodating the company's need to hire
promotable firemen. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).

(The

Court in Plessy upheld as reasonable a state statute requiring separate but

1980]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

It should be emphasized that proposition (3) addresses
only a taking supported by no consideration other than majority will. Assume, for example, that as a result of a change in
technology, a small group of employees receives a windfall
under the operation of compensation provisions in the existing
collective agreement. 149 Under those circumstances, a union
could negotiate retroactively to alter the compensation scheme.
Such an action would not be an expropriation-a taking by the
majority solely to benefit itself-but an accommodation to a relevant change in circumstance 15 0
(4) The majority may decline to advance the interests of
the minority in order to advantage itself As J.. Case teaches,
"the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages ... will generally . . . go in as a
contribution to the collective result.'' l It follows that the ma-

jority need not make any special accommodation to the interests of a minority in order to secure what the majority
perceives as the greatest good for the greatest number.1 2 An
externally imposed requirement of partial accommodation of
equal railway accommodations for blacks. Although the Court stated that
"every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to
such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion for the public good,
and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class," id. at 550, the
Court reasoned that segregated railway cars did not "[stamp] the colored race
with a badge of inferiority." Id. at 551. The Court thus implied that the statute
was not enacted out of malice or hostility toward blacks, but rather to prevent
"a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either." Id. at
544.) In point of fact, the Alabama Supreme Court in Steele relied on Plessy
and expressly stated that "there is no charge of bad faith or malice against the
complainant or any of his class." Steele v. Louisville &N.R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 122,
16 So. 2d 416, 422, rev'd, 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The Supreme Court found a breach
of the duty in Steele not because it disagreed with the Alabama court's characterization of the pleadings, but because the racial distinction alone was held to
be irrelevant to the valid purposes of collective bargaining. 323 U.S. at 203. In
other words, if Mr. Leffier's theory is correct, the Court misapplied the duty of
fair representation in the very decision that created it.
149. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342 (1944); discussion of Jennings v. Jennings, 91 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1949) in Cox, supra note 69, at 165-66.
150. Clyde Summers would apparently not allow a retroactive accommodation on the theory that the collective agreement creates enforceable rights that
can only be prospectively altered. See Summers, supra note 68, at 63-64. Under
the analysis offered here, the union could give retroactive effect to a change if it
complied with the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Kordewick v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 181 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1950) and the discussion of Bosi v.
USM Corp., 90 L.LR.RM. 2867 (D.N.J. 1975) accompanying note 166 infra.
151. J.L Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
152. Duggan v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 510 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 443 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1971); see Trotter v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
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minority interests would improperly involve the court in setting
the terms of the collective agreement. It is one thing, as in Barton Brands,153 merely to return the parties to the terms they
had fashioned prior to the abuse of majority power. It is quite
another to effectively dictate what the terms of a future collective agreement should be.
This distinction is illustrated by an episode in the history
of the American Federation of Musicians, recounted in a recent
study by Robert Gorman. 54 The displacement of live performances by recorded music was a basic concern of the union. Of
the union's 250,000 members, only 53,000 were full-time musicians, and of these only 12,000, or three percent.of the membership, were employed in radio, television, movies, and the
recording industries. From 1946 to 1954, the union maintained
the same wage scale for recording musicians, while creating
two trust funds to modestly supplement the earnings of the
part-time musicians comprising the bulk of the union's membership. One trust was funded by royalties from record sales
and the other by revenue resulting from the release of old films
to television. In 1954, the union negotiated a pay increase for
recording musicians which it then diverted to the record sales
trust fund, thereby maintaining the 1946 scale until 1959. Similarly, the union diverted into the film trust fund "rescoring
fees" that were to have been paid to the musicians who worked
on films released for television. There is no doubt that the
union had the authority to set up the trust funds, an action
which, it assumed, would advantage the majority (the part-time
and the out-of-work musicians),155 By the analysis offered
here, however, the subsequent diversion of funds that had iniStreet Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 309 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
153. Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 146-147 supra.
154. Gorman, The Recording Musician and Union Power: A Case Study of
the American Federation of Musicians, in SUBCOMM. ON CoURTs, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

HOUSE OF REPS., 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORD-

INGS 1071 (Comm. Print 1978).
155. The union's president, James C. Petrillo, explained the diversion of
rescoring fees:
Musicians who originally made the picture received union scale. They
didn't make the picture without pay, and we thought if we took the
money and put it in the Trust Fund it will do more good for 260,000 musicians than a handful of musicians .... In the labor movement you
deal with majority membership; what is best for the majority, not the
individual.
Id. at 1099.
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tially been negotiated as compensation to recording musicians
constituted an expropriation in violation of proposition (3).156
More difficult is the union's decision not to seek a wage
scale increase for recording musicians during the thirteen-year
period. The union was not motivated by hostility or bad faith,
but only by the desire to advantage the majority of its members. At first blush, one is strongly tempted to conclude that it
is unfair representation for a union to fail to seek a pay scale
increase for a minority over a thirteen-year period in order to
benefit the majority-in essence, that the (unemployed) major157 It
ity conscripted the labor of the (employed) minority.
could be further suggested that where the labor market acts as
an inadequate constraint upon the employer, and the situation
of the minority gives no prospect of political concession to the
minority, a tribunal should compel the union to do "more" for
the disfavored group. To hold open the remote possibility of judicial relief, even if limited to this narrowly circumscribed set
of criteria, would provide some additional leverage to the minority and enable it to exact a partial accommodation from the
majority.
It is highly questionable, however, whether such intervention is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in J.I.
Case.'58 A study of union wage policy in the auto industry observed that
The UAW policy on general wage changes was designed deliberThe critical
ately to raise the living standards of low-paid workers ....
task of leadership was above all to maintain majority support, and policies were perforce subordinated to this objective. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the more skilled and highly-paid
production workers should have suffered a significant deterioration in
relative wage position. These workers who, as union and management
officials alike admit, have been "penalized" during the last two decades, have lacked strategic strength within the union and hence the
wherewithal to express their dissatisfactions effectively. In this respect
their position differs radically from that of the skilled craftsmen who,
156. See p. 215 supra.
157. This situation is a variation of the problem contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Chemical &Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971), discussed in note 46, supra. In concluding that retirees
were not statutory employees, and thus that their retirement benefits were not
a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Court observed: "Incorporation of such
a limited-purpose constituency in the bargaining unit would create the potential for severe internal conflicts that would impair the unit's ability to function
and would disrupt the processes of collective bargaining." Id. at 173. Nevertheless, the Court did not declare that in view of the political consequences to the
union, it was impermissible for the union to negotiate for nonemployee retirees.
158. J.X Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See text accompanying notes
10-18 supra.
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despite minority status, have become
an increasingly influential force
15 9
within the union organization.

This situation approximates the conditions suggested for judicial intervention more closely than does the situation of the recording musicians: 160 the skilled production employees could
not have separated themselves from the production unit; the labor market failed to exert sufficient independent pressure on
the employer to provide for an increased wage; and, unlike
craftsmen, the skilled production workers lacked the strategic
strength within the union to exact a concession from the majority.
Unlike the recording musicians, who were disadvantaged
relative to the economy as a whole, the skilled production
workers within the UAW were disadvantaged relative to where
they might have been in the absence of a bargaining relationship. In either case, however, judicial intervention under a
theory of fair representation would require the external imposition of a wage structure. In the UAW situation, such intervention would mean that the Labor Act would be violated
whenever a union adheres to a wage policy of increasing the
pay of the lowest paid workers at the expense of those who, by
skill or effort, could do better without the union. Such a result
could not be reconciled with the conception of collective bar159.

R. MACDONALD,

CoLLECTivE BARGAINING IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

158 (1963). In the steel industry, the composition of the work force has resulted

in widened differentials, a situation which has also been explained in political
terms:
Unlike some industries and unions in which the skill distribution
of employees and members gives considerable power to workers at the
lower end of the wage scale, the distribution of steel classifications is
particularly conducive to percentage wage adjustments.... The 1951
BLS survey of the iron and steel industry wage structure found that it
took a 50c range to encompass half the industry's employees as compared with the automobile industry which, in February 1950, had the
middle 50 per cent of all its production workers concentrated within an
earnings range of only 14 cents.
This wide distribution of employees has made it politically feasible
for the union and eminently practical for the companies to allocate a
portion of their negotiated wage adjustments to the widening of job
class increments. Considerable pressure has been exerted upon the
union's leadership by skilled workers-who are both numerous and influential-to maintain relative differentials between classifications.
J. STIEBER, THE STEEL INDUSTRY WAGE STRUCTURE 247 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
160. It is not at all clear that the recording musicians were truly a helpless
minority. Failure to press for a wage scale increase resulted in numerous lawsuits and a revolt by the minority, including the establishment of a rival union,
which ultimately led the AFM to accommodate the interests of the recording
musicians. Gorman, supra note 154, at 1099-117.
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gaining approved in J.I. Case.161
(5) The majority may ordinarilyprovideforuniform treatment that advantages it at the expense of the minority. If the
majority may benefit itself by not advancing the minority's interests, it may further provide for uniform treatment that benefits the majority, even if the effect is to defeat the aspirations of
a specially situated minority.162 This proposition is illustrated
in Bosi v. USM Corp.1 63 Under the collective agreement, an

employee who was fifty years old and who had thirty years of
service (50/30) could opt for early retirement in the event of a
layoff; this provision would not apply, however, in the event of
plant closing. The plant closed and a plant closing agreement
was negotiated. Under the agreement, the 50/30 group would
not receive the benefit they could have received by early retirement in a normal layoff; the funds that might have gone to
them were to be distributed to the bulk of the work force. The
plant closing agreement was fully explained to the employees
and they voted to ratify it over the opposition of the 50/30
group.
The court concluded that there was no breach of the duty
of fair representation:
[T]he Union was made aware of the drastic impact upon the rights of
the 135 15-year employees if the 41 employees in the 50/30 group were
[T] he Union
permitted to acquire eligibility for early retirement ....
had an interest in seeing that the maximum number of its members received the optimum benefit under the [Pension] Plan, rather than permit a small minority of employees to take a disproportionate share of a
limited fund. Thus, the Union properly put the issue ... before the
membership. 164

This reasoning is not helpful because collective bargaining
agents invariably attempt to secure the optimum good for the
maximum number. The question that the court did not address
161. JI. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See text accompanying notes
10-18 supra.
Professor Wellington, however, has expressed a contrary opinion:
No one would suggest that wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers necessarily violate the union's duty of fair representation. In this situation, perhaps, a failure to discriminate would be a
breach of duty. On the other hand, a situation can be easily imagined
in which an economic distinction has no legitimate basis in industrial
experience, and can be explained only as a disregard of the interests of
a minority group by the majority union.
Wellington, supra note 69, at 1336.
162. Jackson v. TWA, 457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1972); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Butte, A. & Pac. Ry., 201 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mont.
1962).
163. 90 LIRR.M. 2867, 2874 (D.N.J. 1975).
164. Id.
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is why the majority had not unduly advantaged itself at the expense of the minority.
The company's pension plan provided the following fixed
order for the distribution of its assets in the event of termination: first, those who had already retired; second, those who
had achieved normal retirement age but had not yet retired,
and last, those with fifteen or more years of service. There was
no special category for the 50/30 group; those employees were
simply included in the larger group composed of those with
fifteen or more years of service. Under the plan, distribution
would be uniform among all employees in the larger group.
Thus, the crucial question is whether the majority breached the
duty of fair representation when it declined affirmatively to
provide for special treatment of the minority by negotiating a
roughly uniform distribution of the pension fund assets. In order to have found a breach of the duty, the court would have
been required to decide what other, more reasonable treatment
the majority should have accorded the minority. Thus, the potential for intrusion into the collective bargaining process was
significant.
It would have been a different case had the collective
agreement accorded the 50/30 group an early retirement option
in the event of plant closing and had the plant closing agreement abrogated that provision. The external agency would not
be determining whether, in securing a plant closing agreement
benefiting the entire work force, the union had given "enough"
to senior employees. Rather, the question would be whether
the majority may alter a collective agreement that older employees had relied upon in order to give themselves increased
benefits. Union action so predicated would be an expropriation
in violation of proposition (3).165 On the other hand, the majority in Bosi could have acceded to the desires of the 50/30 group;
that is, it could have taken the position that the amount td be
distributed uniformly to those with fifteen or more years of
service would be so small that it would be better to provide
older workers a more significant sum. Even though that action
would alter the prior obligation, it would not breach the duty
under proposition (1)166 because the majority would be favoring the minority at its own expense.
(6)
165.
166.

The collective agreement may draw distinctions that
See p. 215 supra.
See p. 210 supra. But see note 150 supra.
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advantage the majority at the expense of a minority if anyfactor relevant to collective bargainingalso distinguishes the two
groups. The Supreme Court's decisions concerning the duty of
67
fair representation in contract making, that is, Steele,
Humphrey v. Moore,168 and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,169 all
concerned distinctions between groups that were drawn by the
collective agreement. These cases do not, however, stand for
the broad proposition that a union labors under a general obligation not to act. "arbitrarily" in taking a bargaining position.
Rather, a closer reading of these cases supports the narrower
proposition that a majority may advantage itself in a collective
agreement by drawing distinctions between it and a minority if
any other factor relevant to collective bargaining also distinguishes the two groups.
This more circumscribed formulation takes account of two
political realities: first, that a union often must accommodate
employee desires that may well strike a dispassionate observer
as unreasonable or even arbitrary; and second, that such accommodation may properly be based on pure majoritarianism.
Beriault v. InternationalLongshoremen's Union 7 0 is a case in
point. As work decreased due to mechanization, the union negotiated a new contract. Under its terms, longshoremen, who
had not previously worked as checkers, were given a preference in checker work assignments over a minority of part-time
checkers. The court recognized that the majority had advantaged itself at the expense of the minority. Nevertheless,
the distinction between full and part-time status supplied the
additional relevant factor sufficient to sustain the action against
7
a duty of fair representation challenge.' '
Proposition (6) does not itself supply the standards to determine if a distinction between groups is "relevant" for the
purposes of collective bargaining. That determination turns
upon a consideration of industrial practice, the expectations of
the employee community, and the moral standards of the
167. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
168. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
169. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
170. Local 40, Super Cargoes &Checkers of the Int'l Longshoremen's Union,
445 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Ore. 1978), on remandfrom 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974).
171. 445 F. Supp. at 1293-94 ("I do not find it unreasonable for [the union] to
take steps to insure a comfortable standard of living for a large number of regu-

lar employees ... by giving such employees high priority for the available
work even though a minority ... are offered only a limited amount of work
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larger community. 172 For example, a mandatory retirement
provision may advantage a majority composed of the relatively
young at the expense of a minority composed of the relatively
old. Nevertheless, the courts had routinely approved such provisions.173 This age-based distinction, however, was supported
by larger social policy of the time; that is, mandatory retirement was entirely consistent with the purposes of a Social Security system that facilitates the exit of older workers to
provide jobs for previously unemployed young adults. 7 4 So,
too, in the merger of seniority lists, the "length of service at either company"' 7 5 would be a sufficiently relevant independent
factor, supported by industrial experience, to allow a majority
to endtail a minority.17 6
172. Compare Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp.
3, 8 (D.D.C. 1953) ("Here [as in Steele] the discriminations based on prior employment and geography alone are also irrelevant and invidious.") with Associated Transp., 185 N.L.R.B. 631 (1970) ("It is settled that a bargaining
representative for the employees of a particular unit has the right to give an
inferior seniority ranking to employees transferred from another unit."). See
also Conrad v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1974) (twelve month
probationary period for pilots sustained); Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n,
384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968) (union promoted
class B longshoremen with no previous violations to class A status and deregistered class B longshoremen with previous violations; allegations of breach of
the duty of fair representation on these facts held to withstand motion to dismiss); Cafero v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1964) (rule against holding two fulltime jobs sustained). In NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635, 63738 (5th Cir. 1974), distinctions in job assignment made by the union, based on
citizenship and family residence, were held to breach the duty of fair representation. In a related case, Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641,
646-47, 655 (5th Cir. 1974), the court held that such distinctions withstand title
VII scrutiny but fall afoul of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
173. See cases cited in note 117 supra.
174. See Moon & Smolensky, Income, Economic Status, and Policy Toward
the Aged, in INCOME SUPPORT POLICIES FOR THE AGED (G. Tolley & 1.
Burkhauser eds. 1977) 45 ('The tension between providing aid and simultaneously discouraging work effort appears to trouble policymakers less when the
elderly are involved than with the other disproportionately poor groups.").
That policy has been undergoing reexamination in light of the aging of the
American work force. See S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Older workers are now specially protected against discrimination in terms
and conditions of employment by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976). This Act was recently amended to specifically prohibit mandatory retirement of most employees below age 70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a),
92 Stat. 189 (to be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)).
175. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 347 (1964) (emphasis added).
176. Humphrey v. Moore has been read to suggest that there is a duty, abstracted from the Labor Act, to dovetail merged employees. The court in Red
Ball Motor Freight implied as much, 379 F.2d at 143 n.10 ('The condemnations
of refusal to dovetail are legion."). This reading, however, is contrary to the
analysis offered here, in Morris v. Werner-Continental, Inc., 466 F.2d 1185 (6th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973), in Schick v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 395 (7th
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If there is an independently valid distinction, however, the
union must consistently adhere to it; thus, the formulation offered here deals with the authentic situation of arbitrarinessthe treating of the similarly situated differently. In Butler v. Local 823, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,7 7 for example,
the collective agreement provided for the dovetailing of em-

ployees in the event of merger, subject to alteration if the parties felt that different treatment was necessary. 7 8 When a
relatively new company acquired an older one, the employees
of the acquiring company vehemently protested the loss of

their jobs to acquired employees. As a result, the union approved a plan to dovetail only those employees of the acquired
company who were working on the date of the merger and
endtail those employees of the acquired company who were on
layoff status on that date-in effect, splitting the differences between the two groups to assuage the employees of the acquir-

ing company. Although the court of appeals suggested that the
union's decision was the result of hostility directed toward the
employees of the acquired firm, the gravamen of the decision
was the conclusion that the distinction between employees of

the acquired company working and those laid off on the date of
merger was not relevant. If the distinction between working

and layoff status were relevant, consistency would require the
Cir. 1969), and in Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 231 F. Supp. 710
(D. Del.1964), ajffd, 354 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1965).
In support of this proposition, moreover the decision of only one court is
cited. Commercial Telegraphers' Union v. Western Union Tel. Co., 53 F. Supp.
90 (D.D.C. 1943). The case concerned the union's insistence on endtailing employees of an acquired firm in the face of the Federal Communications Commission's insistence on dovetailing employees of merged carriers as a
protective measure under the Communications Act. The court made clear that
the latter requirement was the basis of its holding- 'To the extent that parity,
rather than subordination, adversely affects plaintiff's [union] contract, there
can be no doubt that the statute authorizing the consolidation itself in large
measure has that effect." Id. at 96. It may well be that in some cases external
law imposes solutions more protective of the minority than the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510
F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975). But, analogous to the previous discussion under title
VII, the very fact that Congress has chosen to do so does not necessarily assimilate those special requirements into generalized obligations under the duty of
fair representation. To be sure, these protective measures may express the
moral sense of the community, and that expression-coupled with widespread
industrial practice-is a source that should be looked to as refining the content
of the duty. At some point, a generalized obligation to accommodate the minority might be well grounded; but, in view of the foregoing, it remains to be seen
whether that time has yet arrived.
177. 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
178. Id. at 451.
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179
union to separately dovetail both groups.
A useful further illustration is Deboles v. TWA.18° In
Deboles, the union negotiated separate seniority treatment for
TWA's employees at the Kennedy Space Center. Unlike all
other TWA employees who earned company-wide seniority,
those employed at the Space Center achieved seniority only in
that facility. The Space Center employees were vocal in their
dissatisfaction with facility seniority, and, consequently, the
union sought to secure retroactive system seniority for them.
Although TWA was willing to agree, opposition among other
TWA employees to the proposed change made ratification unlikely. The union accordingly withdrew the earlier proposal
and bargained for system seniority to be effective on the date of
the agreement. The union assured the Space Center group that
it had done all it could to secure retroactive system seniority
and that TWA insisted on the proposal's prospectivity. Although the contract was ratified, the disgruntled Space Center
179. In Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590
F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979), the union was faced with a difficult problem. Under the

contract, layoffs from the Alco Company were made in reverse order of seniority. Generally, however, seniority (or priority) in other companies is acquired
on a date-of-hire basis. Since Alco was going out of business, many employees
wanted to quit in order to establish priority in new jobs. The union ordered a
"freeze" on its members leaving Alco for new jobs so that twelve journeymen
who had been laid off could secure other employment first. After a second
group of thirty journeymen received layoff notice, the union issued a second,
but different, freeze order allowing all Alco journeymen to establish priority
elsewhere once their layoff notice had been issued. The effect was explained
by the court:
[H]aving been prevented by the previous freeze orders from establishing New York newspaper priority superior to that of those with lower
Alco priority because the latter had been laid off from Alco and employed at the newspapers earlier than appellants, appellants were now
to lose New York newspaper priority also to those with higher Alco priority, even though the latter would necessarily be laid off later, or last,
by Alco.
Id. at 454 (emphasis in original).
The Second Circuit found no breach of the duty of fair representation. The
seniority structure in the collective agreement, the court pointed out, did not
anticipate a flood of unemployment. The freeze orders were the union's response to a worsening situation, each rationally attuned to the increasing economic problems at Alco. Even though the effect was to treat some of Alco's
previous employees differently from others, the union's ultimate action might
be consistent with proposition (5); that is, the union's action might be viewed
as the adoption of a uniform rule that had the incidental consequence of disadvantaging a minority. See the further discussion of this case in connection
with proposition (7), infra note 195. See also McDermott v. Teamsters Joint
Council No. 53, 347 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (no breach of the duty of fair
representation for union to dovetail new employees even though the effect dilutes the seniority of a group of employees who had been endtailed eight years
before).
180. 552 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
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employees later sued for breach of the duty of fair representation. They pointed out that the union's decision was based on
the political consequences of retroactive system seniority: a
large number of the union's members elsewhere feared that
with retroactive system seniority, they would be "bumped" by
TWA's Space Center employees in the event of termination of
the TWA-Space Center contract.
The fair representation question in Deboles must be addressed from the perspective of the previous facility-only seniority system. Although that system denied ,Space Center
employees seniority credit on a company-wide basis, it protected them from being "bumped" by senior employees outside
the Space Center. That protection was of significance to Space
Center employees, for it was negotiated during a time of Space
Center expansion and thus of more rapid promotion there than
was possible elsewhere in the TWA system. Because of the differences between Space Center and other TWA operations, a
limitation of facility seniority for Space Center employees was
founded upon relevant factors. 181 Accordingly, the union could
simply have chosen not to seek system seniority for the Space
Center group once a reduction in force impended; that is, the
union could have maintained the facility-only system on the
ground that those employees who had been protected from
"bumping-in" by employees outside the Space Center could not
properly lay claim to equal treatment once hard times arrived,
to the disadvantage of those who had been earlier denied the
benefit of bumping-in. A union declination to advance the interests of the Space Center minority would have been consistent with proposition (4).182 Because no accommodation was
required, it follows a fortiori that no breach of the duty occurred when the union made only a partial accommodation, i.e.,
prospective system seniority. This was unlike Butler v. Local
823, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,8 3 since the union
did not differentiate among those in the Space Center group; it
treated the similarly situated consistently.
181. Moreover, the employer sought to limit seniority to the Space Center to

ensure the stability of the work force by preventing senior system employees

from transferring to the Florida facility for the winter and then exercising their
contractual right to transfer to their regular ports in the summer. The relevance of the employer's bargaining position to the duty of fair representation is
discussed at p. 270 infra.
182. See p. 217 supra.
183. 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 924 (1975). See text accompanying notes 177-179 supra.
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(7) Where higher authority within a union resolves a conflict to favor a more politically influentialfaction, its decision
should be considered majority action for the purposes of the
foregoing propositions. In the Deboles case, the leadership of
the international union was faced with a conflict among different factions of TWA employees. Because the contract was to be
submitted to a ratification vote of the TWA-wide unit, a political
fact which limited the scope of what the union leadership could
accomplish, the case is best viewed as one of direct majority
rule. However, union leaders are often faced with conflicts
among factions that will not be the subject of referendum. Accordingly, the Third Circuit has said that the duty of fair representation is breached by the "arbitrary sacrifice of a group of
employees' rights in favor of another stronger or more politically favored group."'1 84 Again, the use of the term "arbitrary"
is not helpful; the satisfaction of the majority is surely a valid
consideration. The cases cited by the Third Circuit are better
read to suggest that the same limits on a majority's direct advantage over a minority apply as well to a union leadership's
political ability to favor a majority.
In Local 4076, United Steelworkers v. United Steelworkers,185 for example, the Steelworkers' regional director set
aside an arbitrator's award that ordered dovetailing of seniority
lists following a merger, and negotiated a collective agreement
endtailing the employees of the acquired firm. The change was
intended to favor the seventy employees of the acquiring firm
over the thirty employees of the acquired firm. The regional director's action favored the more influential majority by expropriating rights conferred on the minority by the arbitrator's
award, in contravention of proposition (3).186 Because the majority is forbidden by that proposition from taking such action
directly, union leadership should be similarly forbidden so to
act. However, had the union decided initially to endtail the acquired employees, that decision would have been consistent
with proposition (6).187
184. Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry.& S.S. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318, 324 (3d Cir.
1963). See also Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB (Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc.),
379 F.2d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303
F.2d 182, 187 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962).
185. 338 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
186. See p. 215 supra.
187. See p. 222 supra. In Lewellyn v. Flemming, 154 F.2d 211 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 715 (1946), the union negotiated to expand the seniority pool
for bidding on conductor vacancies, an action that had the effect of diluting the
seniority of an employee with long service who, but for the collective agree-
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The proposition offered here suggests that the more removed the union's leadership is from political influence, the
more discretion it should have to do what it believes to be best,
free from judicial interference. 188 A useful illustration is supplied by Waiters Local 781 v. Hotel Association.189 The hotel
employees bargained with a multi-employer association
through a joint board composed of seven locals, each representing a separate craft. It had long been the practice in the industry for banquet waiters to receive a gratuity, fixed by collective
ment, would have been the senior bidder under long-standing company policy
that antedated the collective agreement. Professor Wellington has cited both
Lewellyn and Jennings v. Jennings,91 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949), as decisions that "indicate no awareness whatever of the problem" of fair representation. Wellington, supra note 69, at 1341. Jennings v. Jennings is a clear
violation of proposition (3). See p. 215 supra. Lewellyn, on the other hand, did
not concern an expropriation of the employee's seniority; rather, the union
opened up bidding to a wider seniority pool, an action that had the ancillary
effect of reducing the employee's seniority.
188. It has been pointed out that many bargaining choices do not present
clear majority-minority distinctions.
Most negotiations do not consist of clear-cut choices between majority
and minority interests. Rather, the union works with many demands
that are pressed with varying degrees of intensity by different groups.
Under these circumstances, the typical union member is not simply
identified with the majority or the minority; his interests lie with different groups on different issues. On wages, he may belong to a majority;
on fringe benefits to the minority; on working conditions, he may simply belong to one of the many minorities that are backing special demands relevant to particular job classifications or departments. Under
these conditions, the union negotiator has no easy calculus to decide
which contract will win the largest following in the union.
D. BOK & J. DuNimP,supra note 45, at 113.
It has also been pointed out that the insulation of union leadership from
political accountability frees the leader to choose what he thinks best.
Deep-rooted grievance stemming from conditions within the plant
comprised the third major determinant factor [of the union's decisions] in this case. Using the members of the bargaining committee as
his main line of communication with the rank and file, Hill [the union
business agent] knew that action would have to be taken to mollify the
discontent of the men in the shop. The result was the long, detailed
seniority clause which the bargaining committee hoped would guard
against any recurrence of the alleged examples of favoritism in the
plant. It was on this issue that Hill received the greatest verbal support from members of the bargaining committee during negotiations.
By recounting specific incidents in the shop, by reflecting the angry
mood of the work force, the committee men impressed management
with the fact that this was a real, not a manufactured, issue.
However, Hill would go only so far with the committee men. Because the members in the shop were numerically small, relative to the
entire District, and because these members were distributed among
several locals where their political influence would be diluted, he did
not show concern over the likelihood of being rejected by the members
at the next general election. Thus, Hill felt fairly secure in asserting
himself.
A. Weber, supra note 99, at 149.
189. 498 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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agreement as a percentage of the customer's bill. The bartenders, who received no gratuities under the agreement, attempted
to persuade the joint board to change the practice. When the
joint board refused, the bartenders appealed to the president of
the International, pointing out that agreements in several major
cities allowed bartenders to share in banquet gratuities. The
president agreed and ordered the joint board to insert the bartenders' proposal into the contract demands. The waiters subsequently sued the International alleging a breach of the duty
of fair representation because of the resulting change in their
compensation. In a brief opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit had no difficulty affirming a directed verdict for the defendants: "The doctrine of fair representation must be applied
realistically in the context in which union officials resolve internal disputes, even though a decision in favor of one local or
faction... arouses keen resentment in the hearts of the other
"190

Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss the terms of
the rule change, the provision actually allocated to the bartenders only that share of the gratuity represented by drinks they
personally served. 19 1 Even if the bartenders had obtained
favorable votes from other craft representatives on the joint
committee in return for the bartenders' vote on other issues,
adoption of the gratuities proposal by the committee would not
have breached the duty of fair representation. Although the
majority (the coalition) would have been advantaging itself at
the expense of a minority (the waiters), the provision would be
independently defensible under proposition (6)192 as based on
a relevant factor, inasmuch as bartenders would receive only
that share of the gratuity represented by drinks that bartenders personally served. Accordingly, it follows that union officers removed from the controversy could accomplish the same
change.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the president of
the International could have gone beyond that distinction. For
example, it is unclear whether he could have ordered an in190. Id. at 1000.

191. The relevant provision reads as follows: "Where beverages on which a
service charge is made are served to the guest by a bartender, each bartender
stafling said bar shall receive one waiter's [waiters] share of the service charge
on [the] beverages only." Id. Brief for Appellees at 6, Waiters Local 781 v. Hotel Ass'n, 498 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The bracketed language is the difference
in the statement of the provision contained in the Brief for Appellee Joint
Board at 2.
192. See p. 222 =upra.
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terim reallocation to the bartenders to make up for the period
during which the local practice should have changed. 93 Had
the majority (the coalition) taken this action directly, it would
raise a serious question of expropriation under proposition
(3).194 A persuasive argument can be made, however, that a
union's national officers, if relatively uninfluenced by the political power of either the waiters or bartenders locals in one city,
should be free to conclude that the waiters had been unjustly
enriched by adherence to an outdated practice and that some
redistribution would be warranted.19 5 On the other hand,
under proposition (4),196 it would not have been a breach of the

duty of fair representation for the International president to
have left the outdated practice undisturbed, even if his sole
reason for doing so
was to curry favor with a politically influen97
tial waiters local.'

(8) The duty offair representationin contract making imposes no special procedural obligations toward those who are
eligiblefor union membership. Under the analysis offered here,
and especially in view of Congress' explicit refusal to make
fairness in the conduct of union affairs a statutory right, the
duty of fair representation in contract making imposes no procedural obligations upon the union, unless, as in Steele, 98 the
union is disadvantaging a group that is ineligible to participate
in the union. 19 9 This is not to suggest, however, that union pro193. Three years earlier, the International president had rejected the bartenders' appeal to change the practice on the ground that it would set a bad
precedent for bartenders' unions elsewhere. He reversed himself on this occasion after learning that, in fact, bartenders elsewhere were tip-sharing; that is,
the factual basis for his earlier decision was in error.
194. See p. 215 supra.
195. This aspect of proposition (7) may explain why Ryan v. New York
Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed in note 179 supra, was rightly decided. There is no hint in that case of
political motivation; instead, the case suggests that the union leadership was
struggling, perhaps ineptly, with a serious problem. Accordingly, under proposition (7), the leadership could have altered the current seniority of former
Alco employees to make way for more senior Alco employees.
196. See p. 217 supra.
197. It is, however, extremely unlikely, as a practical political matter, that
the leadership would provide for a retroactive change. By the same token, it is
equally unlikely that the leadership would be inconsistent in adhering to the
new policy.
198. Steele v. Louisville & N.LR., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
199. The Third Circuit has suggested, in cases concerning the merger of
seniority lists arising under the Teamsters' "open-end" grievance procedure,
that the disadvantaged group be given "an opportunity to make their case"
before the decision makers. Price v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 457 F.2d
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cedure is entirely irrelevant to the issue of fair representation
in contract making. For example, the failure to submit a collective agreement to a ratification vote in violation of a union's
own procedures has been held to breach the duty of fair representation. 20 0 Further, the manner in which the union advances
its bargaining position may, in some cases, be evidence of malice, hostility, or bad faith in contravention of proposition (2).201
Finally, examination of the union's procedures may help to
605, 611 (3d Cir. 1972) (citing Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d
32, 38 (3d Cir. 1968)). Although the Third Circuit in Price implied that the
"open-end" grievance procedure is far more akin to collective bargaining than
to grievance arbitration, 457 F.2d at 611, the courts adoption of a requirement
for notice and an opportunity to be heard derives from the notion that what the
union was doing was processing a grievance under the collective agreement,
such that the court could ensure sufficient procedural rigor in the "arbitration"
of the grievance as an element of judicial review of the "award." See also Larson v. All-American Transp., Inc., 83 S.D. 622, 164 N.W.2d 603 (1969).
200. Teamsters Local 310 v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Goclowski
v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1977). Under the theory advanced here, the fair representation aspect of these cases derives from the differential abrogation of a pre-existing right unsupported by any consideration
other than union politics. But see text accompanying note 197 supra. The duty
of fair representation has not been understood to require that the ballots of a
multi-local ratification be separately counted, in the absence of an explicit obligation on the union's part to do so. Black v. Transport Workers, 454 F. Supp.
813 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
201. See p. 211 supra. In Branch 6000, the Board relied on Teamsters Local
671 (Airborne Freight Corp.), 199 N.L.R.B. 994 (1972). Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n
of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Teamsters
were elected by a unit of full-time drivers and regular part-time warehousemen; the former were union members, the latter were not. The union proceeded, in stages, to work for the elimination of all part-time employment. The
Board sustained the administrative law judge's finding that such a course of
conduct breached the duty of fair representation. The theory of the case, however, is obscure. The administrative law judge expressly found that the lack of
membership played no role in the case. 199 N.L.R.B. at 1000. In Branch 6000,
the Court of Appeals nevertheless characterized the case as one involving "discrimination ... between member and non-member employees." 595 F.2d at 811
n.9. The Board found that the union had failed to represent part-time workers
"in a fair and impartial manner." 199 N.L.R.B. 994. That observation is troublesome, insofar as a union may surely act to curtail part-time employment to provide more secure conditions for full-time employees. It is significant, however,
that the union, recently elected by a unit of six full-time drivers and six parttime warehousemen, proceeded in a "duplicitous" manner to eliminate parttime employees. 199 N.L.R.B. at 1000. Indeed, if, during the election, the union
had been candid about its policy concerning part-time workers, it would not
have been selected by a majority. In contrast to Beriault v. Local 40, Super
Cargoes & Checkers of the Int'l Longshoremen's Union, 445 F. Supp. 1287 (D.
Ore. 1978), the disadvantagement was found to be the product of "bad faith" as
manifested by the union's conduct. 199 N.L.R.B. at 1000. In Deboles v. TWA, 552
F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977), on the other hand, where
the union clearly misrepresented the situation to the affected group, there was
simply no impermissible disadvantagement, and so no breach of the duty of
fair representation.

1980]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

clarify or resolve the fair representation question. Under propositions (1)202 and (7),203 no further scrutiny of an action is required where the majority has disadvantaged itself in order to
benefit a minority; thus, it may be unclear whether a majorityis consciously disadvantaging itself. In such a case, a manifestation of majority sentiment, for example, by a vote of ratifica20 4
tion, might be dispositive of the fair representation issue.
3.

The FunctionalAnalysis: A Summary and Application

David Feller has suggested the following test of a successful le-

gal theory:
A legal theory is important ...

only if solutions to particular

problems can be derived from it; it is sound only if the solutions it pro-

duces are more satisfactory than those which would result without itwith
and it is supportable only if it conforms, at least in large measure,
2 05
the principles followed by the courts in the decided cases

The theory offered in this Article attempts to accommodate
the system of majority rule contemplated by the Labor Act
with the need to protect minorities from the abuse of majority
power. There must be a balancing of the nature of the disadvantagement against the degree of external intrusion into internal union affairs required to upset a union's decision. From
this perspective, there is a significant difference between expropriating or abrogating a right or benefit already conferred and
not granting it to begin with. There is similar significance in
the difference between a distinction drawn by a union between
groups it represents and the manner in which it decides to
draw the distinction.
Whether this analysis satisfies Feller's test can be determined by examining the Ninth Circuit's decision in NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Local 315 (Rhodes & Jamieson),206 the one case
that plainly purports to adopt a "rational decisionmaking
202. See p. 210 supra.
203. See p. 227 supra.
204. In Barker v. Newspaper and Graphic Communications Local 6, 461 F.
Supp. 109 (D.D.C. 1978), the union negotiated with the Washington Star to

dovetail stereotypers with pressmen to the disadvantage of some pressmen,
and in contravention of agreements made when their two unions had merged.

The court found no breach of the duty:
At a two-hour local union meeting about the proposed contract, the
President discussed and answered members' questions about the provisions of the contract.... The membership voted 99 to 44 to approve
the contract. The small number of stereotypers in the Union compared
to the larger number of pressmen established mathematically that the
great majority of pressmen voted for the contract.

Id. at 112-13.
205. Feller, supra note 8, at 664.
206. 545 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1976).
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processes" requirement as an element of the duty of fair representation. Under a Teamsters contract, the reassignment rights
of employees displaced by job elimination were to be determined by the local union. The job of one Holman,
a dump
truck driver, was eliminated and the union conducted an election on the following proposition: "Do you want the warehousemen, yard men, flat rack and dump drivers to be re-assigned,
with their full seniority, as ready-mix drivers?" 207 The vote was
twenty to eight against the reassignment, and Holman was terminated.
A majority of the NLRB panel determined that under the
collective agreement, Holman had a right to bump less senior
employees in other jobs; from that perspective, the question
was whether the union had acted arbitrarily in refusing to recognize Holman's reassignment right. The Board noted some
anomalies in the referendum. Although only dump truck drivers had been laid off, the ballot was extended to a larger
group-that is, warehousemen, yard men, and flat rack drivers.
Moreover, because each voter presumably knew whether his
particular job had been slated for elimination, he would also
know whether he would benefit or suffer from an affirmative
vote. In holding that the union had breached the fair representation duty, the majority of the Board stated that the duty
cannot be avoided merely because a decision is made by referendum. The referendum procedure used in Rhodes & Jamieson
did not comply with the duty: "[T]he election itself was
designed so that it could express, not fairness, but only the con208
flict of interest of each member of the electorate.$
In dissent, Board member Penello argued that the case involved contract making-that is, the referendum was not a
means of divesting a right previously accorded, but rather was
employed to determine a question unresolved by the collective
agreement. From that perspective, imposition of a restriction
on bumping rights would not breach the duty of fair representation. In addition, member Penello saw no infirmity in the
union's adoption of a referendum procedure at that time. The
ballot's only potential adverse effect was upon ready-mix drivers, and there was no evidence in the record indicating the voting strength of this group relative to the remaining electorate.
Although the Ninth Circuit, on review, agreed with Penello
207.
208.

Id. at 1175.
217 N.IR.B. 616, 619 (1975).
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that the case involved contract making, the court nevertheless
accepted the Board majority's position:
We do not intimate that it would be improper for a union to use an

election process to make a decision under other circumstances. However, we agree with the Board that to base its decision as to whether
the bumping principle should in general be applied to this Employer
upon an expression from the employees so limited in scope and focus
prejudicial to
constituted arbitrary Union action without rational basis
Holman, and a failure fairly to represent his interests. 20 9

Under the functional analysis offered here, if the Board
majority's reading of the collective agreement in Rhodes &
Jamieson was correct, there was a clear-cut violation of proposition (3):210 the majority abrograted employee Holman's existing right to "bump" in order to benefit itself. On the other
hand, if those adversely affected by the "no bumping" ballot actually were in the majority, no question of fair representation
would have been presented under proposition (1).211 The case
would then have been one of a majority voting to disadvantage
itself. The better view, however, was that taken by both Board
member Penello and the court of appeals: under the existing
contract, the determination of reassignment rights was to be
postponed until after the layoff. The Ninth Circuit suggests
that the referendum was contrary to the requirement under the
contract that the union decide "whether the bumping principle
in general should prospectively be approved." 212 Consistent
with propositions (4)213 and (5),214 but contrary to the Board
majority (and to Branch 6000),215 the union surely could have
held a referendum in order to decide whether there would be
bumping in general. Consequently, the majority could have
2 16
voted for a general "no bumping" rule solely to favor itself.
The union breached the duty of fair representation not because it held a referendum, but because the distinction resulting from the vote denied some the right to bump while leaving
the resolution of the rights of others open. This distinction
209. 545 F.2d at 1176.
210. See p. 215 supra.
211. See p. 210 supra.
212.

545 F.2d at 1176.

213. See p. 217 supra.
214. See p. 220 supra.

215. Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
216.

Contrary to the reasoning in Branch 6000, see text accompanying notes

86-88 supra, the union permissibly could have limited such a vote to its own

members. Were the effect of such a vote to give bumping rights to union mem-

bers only, however, the result would run afoul of proposition (2). See p. 211
supra.
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rested upon no consideration relevant to bargaining 217 other
than the majority's desire to favor itself by not allowing
Holman to bump while hedging its bets against the possibility
of more widespread layoffs in the future. Similar to the union's
decision in Butler v. Local 832, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters2 1 8 to dovetail some acquired employees while
endtailing others, the majority's action treated the similarly situated differently, thereby contravening proposition (6).219 Accordingly, depending on how one reads the somewhat muddled
record, Rhodes & Jamiesoncould have been readily disposed of
without suggesting that a referendum reflective only of a conflict of interest within the unit breaches the duty of fair representation. 220 To return to Feller's test,2 21 this analysis helps in

applying the duty of fair representation to concrete cases, it
produces more satisfactory results than are produced without
it, and it conforms in large measure to what courts actually do.
D.

FAIR

REPRESENTATION AND PRIVATE ORDERING

The limits of majority rule in private sector collective bargaining derive from positive law and the duty of fair representation. Positive law directly constrains employer policy; by
limiting what an employer may agree to, such constraints also
limit what unions may demand. The duty of fair representa217.

It would have been relevant, for example, if different skills were re-

218.

514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975). See text accom-

quired of ready-mix drivers than were required of dump-truck drivers.
panying notes 177-179 supra.
219. See p. 222 supra.
220. See also the criticism of the analogous reasoning in Branch 6000 in
note 102 supra. It should also be noted that Holman had appealed to the
union's executive board, which sustained his appeal because the "vote was
taken after the fact that an operation was being eliminated and that a fair vote
could not be taken" at that time. Rhodes & Jamieson, 545 F.2d at 1175. That the
union hierarchy thought the contractual distinction unfair is significant under
proposition (6), see p. 222 supra,but the ground asserted seems difficult to reconcile with Teamster practice. Teamster agreements, as in Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (see text accompanying notes 62-64 supra), usually
reserved to later negotiation the rights of employees affected by merger or absorption. Under such an arrangement, the union's decision concerning the
rights of employees is made not in advance of the merger but only after the
fact, when the dimensions of the situation are known. Necessarily, some will
benefit and some will suffer by whatever decision the union makes. Nevertheless, in Humphrey v. Moore, the Court sustained a union's ability to decide the
seniority consequences of a merger after the fact. Although the timing of the
referendum is relied upon as a factor in the case, neither the Labor Board nor
the court of appeals discusses the relevance of Humphrey v. Moore.
221. See text accompanying note 205 supra.

19801

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

tion, on the other hand, is a direct limit on unions, and affects
employers only secondarily. Accordingly, the duty of fair
representaion in contract making is usually unconcerned with
the fairness or reasonableness of the employer's bargaining position. It is assumed that the employer is acting in his self-interest. If he is taking a plainly unreasonable, or even arbitrary
bargaining stance, the remedy must be found in the Act's requirement of good faith bargaining. As a result, the case law
governing the duty of fair representation in contract making is
almost entirely concerned with decisions in which the employer had little or no voice-that is, decisions that the union
was free to make. Examples include the decisions to grant or
deny "bumping" rights in Rhodes & Jamieson,222 to apportion
banquet gratuities among bartenders and waiters in Waiters
Local 781 v. Hotel Associationm and to set the schedule for
days off in Branch 6000.224

To be sure, a contractual distinction that intentionally disadvantages a group specially protected by positive law also
breaches the duty of fair representation owed to that group. In
such a case, the source of the bargaining demand is irrelevant.
Once that special case is put aside, however, it becomes clear
that the duty of fair representation does not function as a separate, uniform limit on the terms of a collective agreement, divorced from the bargaining process that produced the
agreement.
For example, in Strick Corporation,22 5 an arbitrator
awarded 200 employees, discharged for engaging in a wildcat
strike, the right to be rehired with full seniority, the rehiring to
occur as strike replacements quit and their jobs become available. Reinstatement on those terms would adversely affect the
seniority of remaining strike replacements, who then comprised the overwhelming majority of the employer's work force.
The replacements pressured the union to abrogate the award,
threatening to seek the union's decertification if it proved insensitive to their demands. The employer opposed the award
on the grounds that the award would encourage further strikes
in breach of a no-strike commitment and would cause labor unrest as former strikers were reinstated who enjoyed greater
222.

545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976).

See text accompanying notes 206-209

498 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

See text accompanying notes 189-190

supra.
223.

supra.
224. 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
225. 241 N.LIIB. No. 27 (Mar. 19, 1979).
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seniority than the remaining strike replacements. Accordingly,
the company insisted upon abrogation of the arbitrator's award
as a condition of a subsequent collective agreement. The
union, unable to persuade the current work force to strike to
their own detriment, capitulated to the employer's demand,
and the strike replacements charged a breach of the duty of
fair representation.
The administrative law judge concluded that the threat of
decertification was a valid consideration and that the union's
action was therefore not arbitrary. On the face of it, however,
the union's action would appear to be an impermissible expropriation under proposition (3).226 To reconcile the administrative law judge's view with the court's holding in Barton
Brands,227 one would have to conclude that the abrogation of
previously accorded rights can be legitimated by the additional
consideration of a union's institutional survival. The Board
avoided this troublesome distinction and focused instead on
the union's position vis-A-vis the employer rather than the employees. The Board held that the duty of fair representation
did not limit the employer's demands and that, under the circumstances, the union did not breach the duty by capitulating
228
to those demands.
226. See p. 215 supra.
227. Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 146-147 supra.
228. While we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's ultimate finding that Respondent Unions did not violate their duty of fair representation, we regard as irrelevant the fact that the Unions may have lost
the support of the then-working unit members if the Unions had failed
to accede to the Employer's demand for a contract clause abrogating
the arbitrator's award giving rise to this controversy. The only issue
presented herein is whether the Unions acted arbitrarily or in bad faith
in acquiescing in the Employer's demand for the clause. Given the
particular circumstances herein, including the Employer's adamant demand for the clause, the Employer's avowed intention to "take a
strike" if the Unions failed to agree to the clause, the desire of the
working employees and their shop committee that the clause be included, and the probable ineffectiveness of a strike in opposition to the
clause and the fact that resistance of the clause further would delay
implementation of the new contract and its improved benefits thus resulting in detriment to working employees, we conclude that the Union
was faced with a "Hobson's choice," and in making its decision did not
act arbitrarily or in bad faith.
241 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 2-3 (Mar. 19, 1979) (emphasis in original). See
also Bruen v. Local 492, Int'l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 425 F.2d
190, 191 (3d Cir. 1970) ("[the contested seniority clause] was placed in the
agreement at the suggestion of the company negotiator to eliminate existing
friction in the Division involving those employees but the company was not
willing to make this exception the rule by extending it to cover all future em").
ployees ....
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A contrary view would ignore the relevance of the bargaining process to the duty of fair representation. Under such a
view, the duty of fair representation would be breached by a
union's mere participation in a collective agreement that
strikes an impermissible balance between groups the union
represents. The logic of this position requires the federal judiciary (and the Labor Board) to decide at the outset what fairness dictates the terms of a collective agreement to be, thereby
converting the system of private ordering to one of public ordering. However, the reason the duty of fair representation is
"subtle business" 2 9 is precisely because it must accommodate
the bargaining process.2 0 Accordingly, the fact that the duty of
fair representation in private sector contract making operates
primarily as a limit upon the union, not the employer, should
play a significant role in ascertaining whether the system of
private sector collective bargaining can be transferred into the
public sector without modification.

M. THE PUBLIC SECTOR
When the system of exclusive representation is translated
into public employment, the frame of reference explored in
Part II changes. As Clyde Summers explains,
The uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor
in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the
employer. The employer is government the ones who act on behalf of
the employer are public officials; and the ones to whom those officials
are answerable are citizens and voters. We have developed a whole
structure of constitutional and statutory principles, and a whole culture
of political practices and attitudes as to how government is to be conducted, what powers public officials are to exercise, and how they are
to be made answerable for their actions. Collective bargaining by public employers must fit within the governmental structure and must
229. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "GovernmentalAction," '70 YALE L.J. 345, 361 (1961).

230. As a practical matter... courts must use a relatively loose standard like "reasonableness" when judging union conduct. The alternative is for courts to assume a task they probably could not perform
well Problems vary from industry to industry and from union to
union. The internal structure and politics of a union, the history of collective bargaining and the present power relations reflected in it, and
the state of development and economic condition of an industry, are
the obvious, though by no means the exclusive, interacting factors
which affect judgments about competing employee claims. A court is
institutionally unable to second guess union judgments which result
from a weighing and balancing of such dynamic variables. And as one
moves away from tests of reasonableness one moves ineluctably into
the second guessing game.
Id. at 362.
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function consistently with our governmental processes....231

How the frame of reference differs because of the nature of
the employer is illustrated in the current controversy surrounding the scope of bargaining in the public sector 232 in this setting, one encounters problems not commonly encountered in
private employment. First, a statute might specifically govern a
seemingly bargainable matter arguably precluding negotiation.
Second, management prerogatives reserved to the public employer under the state's collective bargaining law may prohibit
the public employer from agreeing to a contract demand. To
similar effect, a concession to a contract demand might be precluded by the statutory powers of the public employer under
the legislation that created the particular agency. Finally, a
court might decline to give effect to a provision of a collective
'2 33
agreement that it considers offensive to "public policy.
These limits exist because of a perceived conflict between ordering by collective agreement and the democratic nature of
governmental processes. Because the employer is government,
some contract provisions that would be enforceable in the private sector might not be permitted to be the subject of negotiation in the public sector.
Like federal laws that limit employment policy in the private sector, a narrowed scope of public sector bargaining limits
231. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. Cin. L. REV. 669, 670 (1975).
232. See, e.g., Nelson, State Court Interpretationof Teacher Collective Bargaining: Four Approaches to the Scope of BargainingIssue, 2 bNDus. REL L.J.
421 (1977); Sackman, Redefining the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C. L_ REv. 155 (1977); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective,83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); Weisberger, The AppropriateScope
of Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 685. See also Feller & Finkin, Legislative
Issues in Faculty Collective Bargaining,in FACULTY BARGAININRIN PUBLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION 117-31, 164-74 (1977) (Carnegie Council series) for a proposed solution.
233. For example, in Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40
N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals held that a school board lacks the power to agree to a provision that
would allow a nontenured teacher to arbitrate his nonretention under a standard of 'just cause." The state education law provides that a nontenured
teacher may be refused reappointment without stated reasons. The school
board's responsibility to renew or not "must be exercised by the board for the
benefit of the pupils and the school district and cannot be delegated or abnegated. Accordingly, it is beyond the power of the board to surrender... as
part of any agreement reached in consequence of collective bargaining." Id. at
777-78, 358 N.E.2d at 880, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 55. The sense of the decision is that the
legislature intended there to be a period of probation and that it offends the
public interest for a school board to collapse the distinction between probation
and tenure by collective agreement.
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the content of collective agreements, and thus serves as a limit
on majority rule. The permissible scope of public sector bargaining varies from state to state and is beyond the scope of
this Article; this discussion assumes, for the purposes of analysis, that the parties have the power to negotiate upon a particular question as a matter of state law.
A. THE CONSTITUTION AS A LIMIT ON THE PUBLIC EMPLOYER
In 1927, the Tennessee Supreme Court made the following
observation of that state's "Monkey Law" forbidding the teaching of evolution:
[I]t is an act of the state as a corporation, a proprietor, an employer. It
is a declaration of a master as to the character of work the master's
servant shall, or rather shall not, perform. In dealing with its own employees engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the
limitations of . ..2 the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
34
the United States.

Implicit in this analysis, as William Van Aistyne has pointed
out, is a theory of "reverse state action"--government, when
acting as an employer, is functioning no differently from a private employer and is therefore just as unhampered by the Constitution as the private employer would be. 235 This reasoning,
Van Alstyne has also pointed out, completely inverts the logic
2 36
of the Constitution.
It is now well established that the Constitution imposes
limits upon the government even in its role as an employer.
Unlike those of a private employer, a government employer's
policies concerning, for example, citizenship, 23 7 political belief
and afflfiation, 238 and extramural 23 9 and intramural 2?4 utter234. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 112, 289 S.W. 363, 365 (1927).
235. See Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property'". Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CoRNELL L. REV. 445 passim (1977).
236. The Bill of Rights exempted private parties, but not governmen4
because those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights were not then
apprehensive of private parties, but were apprehensive of government.
Similarly, the fourteenth amendment exempted private parties, but not
government, because those who drafted and ratified it were not then
sufficiently apprehensive of private parties, but were apprehensive of
state government To say that private citizens may deal with one another "unhampered by" the fourteenth amendment may be true....
but plainly it says nothing at all as to why a state may likewise deal
with private citizens unhampered by that amendment, which was
drafted precisely to hamper the state.
Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).
237. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
238. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
239. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64.183

ances, must withstand constitutional scrutiny simply because
the employer is the government.

This Article's concern is less with the substance of constitutional law than with the function of the Constitution under a
regime of collective bargaining. A useful predicate for that
analysis is supplied in three illustrative situations. Whether

the result should differ because the challenged action complies
with provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is examined later.
A case of academicfreedom. A school board issues a directive to teachers
of an elective, twelfth grade course in contemporary poetry, forbidding the
assignment of outside reading for credit or in-class recitation of enumerated works of two "beat" poets-Alan Ginsberg and Lawrence Ferlinghetti.
The Board has stipulated that an appropriate decisionmaker could permissibly determine that the books are suitable for use by the class.2 4 1

The Supreme Court has indicated, at least in dicta, that academic freedom is protected by the first amendment. 242 Accordingly, several lower courts have held that secondary school
teachers have a modicum of first amendment protection for
their professional utterances, including the assignment of supplemental readings. 243 So long as the literary works assigned
are suitable for the purposes of the class, are not obscene, and
are in keeping with the students' level of maturity, the first
amendment forbids the school board to impose its own brand
of literary orthodoxy upon the classroom. The school board's
directive here is a clear violation of academic freedom. 244
A case of termination of tenure. The rules of a state university provide that
240. See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 99 S. Ct. 693
(1979).
241. The case is Cary v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977),
a#'d, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979), discussed in Note, Union Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Academic Freedom as a BargainingChip in Union Contracts,49
U. CoLO. L. REv. 299 (1978). The author drafted a brief amicus curiae in the
case on appeal to the Tenth Circuit on behalf of the American Association of
University Professors.
242. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
243. See Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Ore. 1976); Sterzing v.
Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated on remedial grounds, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387
(D. Mass.), aft'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp.
352 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
244. In Cary v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977), af'd, 598
F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979), the district court held that the first amendment protected the teachers' right to assign the books but went on to hold that a collective agreement, which recognized the school board's management prerogatives,
operated to waive the right. The Tenth Circuit reversed on both issues, thereby
affirming the result but not the district court's reasoning. However, the first
amendment limb of the Tenth Circuit's decision cannot be reconciled with the
cases cited in note 243 supra.
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academic tenure, once awarded, confers a right to continued employment
until retirement, subject to termination upon the existence of specified conditions such as "cause" to dimisss or "financial exigency." There are no express standards or procedures provided to determine the existence of the
conditions. A tenured professor is dismissed by reason of an alleged "Iinancial exigency."

246
2 45
and Perry v. Sindermann,
In Board of Regents v. Roth
the Supreme Court returned to the precise language of the

fourteenth amendment: a violation of one's right to due process in the termination of public employment occurs only when
the employee has been deprived of a constitutionally cogniza-

ble liberty or property interest. "Property," however, is not created by the Constitution; it derives from an independent
source, such as state law or an informal source recognized by
state law. In Arnett v. Kennedy,247 however, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, conceived of one's "property" in a

government job as including the procedure for its divestiture:
"[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a [public employee] must
take the bitter with the sweet." 24 Mr. Justice Powell, writing
for himself and Mr. Justice Blackmnun, concurred in the result
but rejected the plurality's analysis. The plurality's approach,
he reasoned,
would lead directly to the conclusion that whatever the nature of an individual's statutorily created property interest, deprivation of that interest could be accomplished without notice or a hearing at any time.
This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a
property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently
recognized, the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a
statutorily
created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional
24 9
terms.

Thus far, the positivist reasoning of the Arnett plurality has
not unequivocally commanded a majority of the Court. In
Bishop v. Wood,25 0 however, the Court held that the sufficiency
245. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
246. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
247. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
248. Id. at 153-54.
249. Id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
250. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). It has been argued that Bishop accepts, at least tacitly (and wrongly), the positivism of the Arnett plurality. Note, DemocraticDue
Process: Administrative Procedure After Bishop v. Wood, 1977 DuKE L.T. 453,
459-60 (1977). Compare Prince v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1976)
with Muscare v. Quinn, 520 F.2d 1212, 1216 nA (7th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted,425 U.S. 560 (1976) and Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 426
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of the claim of entitlement to a job in state or local government
must be determined by state law. Only if the state recognizes
something akin to tenure-a state-granted entitlement to continued employment-does the fourteenth amendment due
process requirement apply. But if the fourteenth amendment
does apply, the employee is constitutionally entitled to contest-in some forum, at some time, and with sufficient procedural rigor-the validity of the grounds asserted for the
termination. In the "financial exigency" case, the tenured professor enjoys the quintessential '"property"; accordingly, the
fourteenth amendment commands that he be given an opportunity to contest both the authenticity of the reason asserted for
the termination, and the reasonableness of the 251
standards employed to single out his position for termination.
A case of changing rules. Under the policies of the school board, a tenured
teacher must acquire so much academic credit within a three-year period;
failure to engage in mandated continuing education results in withholding
of salary increments. A teacher, relying upon that policy, elects to forego

salary increments for two years by declining to pursue further study. The
legislature then mandates salary increments for all teachers. The school
board alters the continuing education policy to make noncompliance
grounds for termination. As a result, the teacher (and a few others similarly situated) has only one academic year to comply while all other teachers (who
2 52had been pursuing continuing education) have three years to
comply.

The requirement of continuing education arguably advances a legitimate state interest and invades no constitutionally protected interest of the teacher. The difficulty here is the
disparate impact of the policy change. The Supreme Court
held that the addition of a new sanction to assure conformity
with school policy, made necessary by the abolition of the previous sanction, did not unconstitutionally burden the group
that had relied on the previous sanction; but, it seems clear
that the result would have been different had the new sanction
been retroactively applied, i.e., without allowing that group any
opportunity to secure the requisite number of academic hours.
The analysis in each of the illustrative cases contrasts with
the analysis in the private sector. Inasmuch as the Constitution is inapplicable, a private school is free to impose an orthoF. Supp. 1272, 1287 (D. Del. 1976). This question is further discussed in note 298
infra.
251. See Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1976); Klein v.
Board of Higher Educ., 434 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Johnson v. Board of
Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), affid mem. 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir.
1975); Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974); Brady v.
Board of Trustees, 196 Neb. 226, 242 N.W.2d 616 (1976).
252. The case is Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
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doxy in the classroom. By the same token, a private university
could limit the standards or procedures used to terminate "tenured" faculty; there is no limitation, other than that found in
the law of contract, upon a private institution's ability to adopt
the positivism reflected in the Arnett plurality.253 Finally, nothing prohibits the private employer from changing rules after
the game is over (or from treating those similarly situated differently) ,54 unless to do so would be inconsistent with the individual contract or with antidiscrimination legislation.

B.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER THE CONsTrUTION

In the absence of a collective bargaining relationship, a
governmental employer is constrained by the Constitution.
The question is whether the establishment of a bargaining relationship in the public sector alters the character of that constraint. That issue will be explored by reference to three
particular constitutional provisions: the first and fourteenth
amendments and the contract clause.
1.

The FirstAmendment

Two decisions of the Supreme Court concern the first
amendment as a limit on exclusive representation in the public
sector. In City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission,295 a school board allowed a nonunion teacher, in
a school board session otherwise devoted to hearing the views
of the public, to voice opposition to the union's demand for an
agency shop clause. 25 6 The clause was then under negotiation
with the teachers' union. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission held that the school board's action constituted an unfair labor practice. "In the private sector," as Clyde
Summers has pointed out, "even listening to the minority representative might be viewed as undermining the majority
union's status."'257 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that
the Commission's order violated the first amendment; the state
impermissibly conditioned access to a public forum not on the
253. See text accompanying notes 247-248 supra.
254. See generally Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust DismissaL" A Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); sources cited in id at 484

n.12.
255. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
256. An agency shop clause requires nonunion members to pay to the union
a sum equivalent to union dues.
257. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE LJ. 1156, 1198 (1974).
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relevance of the speaker to the agenda, but on the content of
expression otherwise relevant to the business before the public
agency.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2 8 the Court confronted a first amendment challenge to an agency shop clause
in the public sector. The Court had earlier held that the exaction of union dues under explicit statutory authorization withstood constitutional scrutiny in the private sector, except that
the union could not exact monies to be expended in support of
political or ideological causes unrelated to the union's role as
negotiator and administrator of collective agreements. 259 Inasmuch as that decision was thought to avoid the possible first
amendment issues involved in the statutorily authorized
agency shop, the Court had no difficulty in applying that decision to similar effect in the public sector. Mr. Justice Powell,
writing for himself and Justices Burger and Blackmun, concurred in the result but argued that closer scrutiny was required in the public sector. In the view of the concurring
Justices, government may authorize parties to enter into agreements in the private sector that government could not itself
adopt without violating the first amendment. Nevertheless, it
does not appear that the majority disagreed with the concurring Justices' characterization of the constitutional status of the
collective agreement in the public sector.
The collective-bargaining agreement to which a public agency is a
party is not merely analogous to legislation, it has all the attributes of
legislation for the subjects with which it deals. Where a teachers'
union ... obtains the agreement of the school board that teachers residing outside the school district will not be hired, the provision in the
bargaining agreement to that effect has the same force as if the school
board had adopted it by promulgating a regulation.
...
[T]he [School] Board's collective-bargaining agreement, like
any other enactment of state law, is fully subject to the constraints
260 that
the Constitution imposes on coercive governmental regulation.

This view of the collective agreement, and thus of the constitutional consequences flowing from it, draws support from
the function of the collective agreement in industry. Although
the Labor Act speaks of the collective agreements as "contracts" for the purposes of securing judicial enforcement, 261 the
better analogy is to legislation. 262 The union and the employer
from time to time adopt rules governing the workplace. Al258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

431 U.S. 209 (1977).
See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
431 U.S. at 252-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1976).
See Weyand, supra note 18, at 561.
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though collective bargaining serves as a device by which at
least some of the rules that would otherwise be established
unilaterally by management are jointly established, the rules

nevertheless remain those of management:
The rules contained in [the collective agreement] are standards
against which management's actions are to be measured, but management retains the right to act, to manage the business and direct the
working forces. This means that management retains the exclusive
power to administer the rules, not only those governing the productive
process, but also those relating to wages, hours and working conditions. No matter how specific the rule, the initial determination of its
proper application, and the right to insist on performance by the employees in accordance with that interpretation, remains with management, precisely as if the rules had been unilaterally
adopted by it for
263
the internal guidance of management personnel.

Like the private sector employer, the public employer
adopts rules governing the workplace. The federal Constitution

does not prohibit government from committing itself to "meet
and confer" with its employees' representative on proposed
rules in an effort to achieve agreement on them; 26 but as City
of Madison265 teaches, that special means of employee partici-

pation is in addition to the other channels of political activity
and protest designed to influence governmental decisions available to all citizens, including decisions concerning terms and

conditions of public employment. Similarly, although the Constitution does not prohibit the public employer from "conferring" for the purposes of employee participation exclusively
with a representative selected by a majority of the employees,
in contradistinction to the private sector, the grant of exclusivity does not affect the employees' right to petition government

for redress of grievances in derogation of the bargaining relationship.2 66 Rules adopted in a public sector collective agree-

ment, however, must withstand constitutional scrutiny simply
263. Feller, supra note 8, at 737.
264. The duty to bargain in the private sector is defined by 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976) as including only the obligation "to meet ... and confer in good
faith."
265. City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167 (1976). See text accompanying notes 255-257 supra.
266. In the private sector, an employee may be dismissed for peacefully distributing leaflets in public areas adjacent to his employer's premises, in derogation of an existing bargaining relationship, to protest his employer's policies.
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). The Court has
expressed a radically different view with regard to public sector employees:
"Surely no one would question the absolute right of the nonunion teachers to
consult among themselves, hold meetings, reduce their views to writing, and
communicate those views to the public generally in pamphlets, letters, or expressions carried by the news media." City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 n.10 (1976) (emphasis added).
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because the government is the employer.267
Accordingly, in the academic freedom case, it should make
no difference whether the school board acted unilaterally in
forbidding the use of otherwise appropriate teaching materials,
or acted pursuant to a term in a collective agreement with a
teachers' union that permitted the school board to censor
teaching materials. The issue in either case is whether the restriction on teaching materials offends the first amendment.
The collective agreement is immaterial to the analysis of that
issue. The first amendment, like the Bill of Rights generally, is
a limit upon the power of the political majority, in this case, the
school board. It would make no sense at all to allow a different
political majority-that of one's fellow workers 268-to limit the
first amendment by ratifying a collective agreement having that
effect. If a teachers' union can bargain away academic freedom,
or, more accurately, if a school board can limit academic freedom by securing the agreement of the majority representative,
there is no reason why the school board could not also, by such
agreement, forbid political expression in or out of school, 269 re267. Thus, in deciding the permissibility of a collective agreement's provision for exclusive union access to certain intramural means of communication,
the Second Circuit stated:
[A] dispute, commonplace in the private sector, becomes constitutional
litigation by virtue of the fact that public employers (the school
boards) are involved, rather than private entities ...
Mindful of the
undesirability of becoming entangled in the operation of local school
systems, we nevertheless must address this case in a constitutional,
rather than a private law framework.
Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471,
478 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and
Minority Union Rights in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 1004 (1970);
Note, The Validity of Exclusive Privileges in the PublicEmployment Sector, 49
NOTRE DAME LAw. 1064 (1974). In Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. State
University at Stony Brook, 82 Misc. 2d 334, 368 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1974), the
court sustained a contractual exclusion of rival organizations from using university facilities for meetings. The exclusion, however, was limited only to the
rival organizations' organizational activity in opposition to the Civil Service
Employees Association. The court thought (rather curiously) that government,
in imposing such an exclusion, would not be limiting access according to the
content of expression. That decision cannot be reconciled with City of
Madison.
268. In fact, most often teachers accept the prevailing norms of the communities in which they live and work. Thus, until recently, secondary school
teachers have not vigorously asserted a right to academic freedom. See generally A. APPLEBEE, TRADITION AND REFORM IN THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH: A HISTORY (1974); H. BEALE, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN 'AMERICAN
SCHOOLS (1941); W. ELSBREE, THE AMERICAN TEACHER (1939).

269. See Tinker v. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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quire teachers to salute the flag,270 require teachers to belong

to a particular political party,27 ' or mandate any number of
other employment-related conditions that the Constitution
clearly forbids the public employer to do directly. Deference to
collective agreement upon such questions would allow government to do that which the Constitution plainly forbids.
2. The FourteenthAmendment
The Court has never accepted the notion that the first
amendment may be waived as a condition of government employment.2 72 The Court has held, however, that an individual
may waive the right to due process under the fourteenth
amendment, at least if certain conditions are met. 273 It could
be argued that if the individual may so relinquish that constitutional right, so may a collective representative acting on his behalf. In Antinore v. State,2 7 4 the New York Court of Appeals
embraced that theory.
a. The Theory of Waiver of Due Process by Collective
Agreement
Under New York law, the dismissal of a permanent state
civil servant could occur only after a relatively elaborate triallike hearing. In 1972, the legislature amended the law to allow
those procedures to be supplemented, modified "or replaced by
agreements negotiated between the state and an employee organization" acting as a collective bargaining agent under that
state's public employment collective bargaining law.2 75 The
270. Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1973).
271. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).

272. In Elrod v. Burns, id., the Court held that a political test for the hiring
or retention of non-policy-making government employees violated the first
amendment. The dissent argued in part that prior beneficiaries of the political
patronage system could not be heard to complain when the system under
which they acquired their jobs operated to oust them. The plurality took note
of the argument, pointing out that it
completely swallows the rule. Since the [political] qualification may
not be constitutionally imposed absent an appropriate justification, to

accept the waiver argument is to say that the government may do what
it may not do. A finding of waiver in this case, therefore, would be contrary to our view that a partisan job qualification abridges the First
Amendment.
Id. at 360 n.13. The concurring Justices were also apparently unpersuaded by
the waiver argument. See id. at 374.
273. See text accompanying notes 285-289 infra.
274. 40 N.Y.2d 921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976).
275. Act of May 15, 1972, ch. 283, § 1, 1972 N.Y. Laws 1432 (codified at N.Y.

Cirv. SERV. LAw § 76(4) (McKinney 1973)).
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Civil Service Employees Association, the exclusive representative for the bulk of the state's work force, negotiated to subject
all disciplinary action to the agreement's arbitration procedure
in lieu of the previous statutory system. A permanent civil servant was served with notice of charges and a prospective termination of employment which, under the agreement, he could
contest through arbitration. Instead, he sought to declare the
arbitration procedure constitutionally infirm because, unlike
the previously applicable statutory hearing procedure, the arbitration procedure provided that the arbitrator would not be
bound by the rules of evidence, he need not provide reasons for
his decision, a transcript would not be provided unless the employee paid for it, and only limited judicial review of the arbitrator's award would be available. Although the intermediate
appellate court in Antinore indicated that some of these features cast "doubt upon [the] constitutional sufficiency" of the
procedure, 276 the court held that the collective agreement operated as a waiver of the employee's right to constitutional due
process: "due process requirements-and we think equal protection as well-are not relevant when they have been waived
by the party seeking to assert them, as by voluntarily entering
into an agreement for the resolution of disputes in a manner
which dispenses with one or more of the rights constitutionally
2 78
guaranteed. '2 77 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
The full sweep of this reasoning is reflected in Di Lorenzo
v. Carey,2 79 a consolidated case concerning the termination of
tenured faculty at the State University of New York (SUNY).
The collective agreement for the University's professional staff
allowed termination because of "retrenchment," 280 and provided that the agreement's arbitration provision would be the
sole and exclusive means of adjudicating retrenchment decisions. Under the collective agreement, however, the University
administration had the discretion to determine whether the institution's financial status required retrenchment. The administration could also determine the standards and procedures
276. Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 9, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213, 216 (1975), affd, 40
N.Y.2d 921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976).
277. 49 A.D.2d at 10, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
278. Antinore v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976).
279. 62 A.D.2d 583, 405 N.Y.S.2d 356, appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 832, 409
N.Y.S.2d 212 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Farrell v. Carey, 440 U.S. 914 (1979).
The author argued these appeals before the Appellate Division on behalf of
amicus curiae American Association of University Professors and represented
the plaintiffs for the purpose of appeal from the decision of that court.
280. 62 A.D.2d at 586, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
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used to identify the "unit, program or ... other level of organi-

zation"2'8 that would be subject to cutbacks. Two tenured
professors were terminated at the State University College at
Brockport, ostensibly because of fiscal retrenchment. 282 They
sued in state court, asserting that the fourteenth amendment
commanded that they be given some opportunity to contest
both the validity of the institution's claim of financial exigency
and the reasonableness of the standards and procedures utilized to identify them for retrenchment-matters that were unreviewable as reserved to the administration under the
collective agreement. 28 3 The trial court dismissed upon the
strength of Antinore. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating
that the faculty members "agreed to be bound by the collective
bargaining agreement by their membership in the negotiating
unit, irrespective of whether they personally supported the
contract when approved. Whatever other rights they might
have had of a procedural or constitutional nature, are deemed
waived ...."284
281. Id. at 586-87, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
282. The Higher Education Committee of the New York State Assembly
later concluded that the State University "was not under budgetary mandate or
constraint" to terminate tenured faculty. Report on Retrenchments in Higher
Education, 1977, at 8 (January 1978).

283. It might have been possible to read the collective agreement differently, and, in fact, the State of New York argued in its brief opposing certiorari
that the question of the scope of the arbitration clause had yet to be determined because the grievances had not been submitted to arbitration. Brief for
Respondents in Opposition to Granting Certiorari at 5, Farrell v. Carey, 440 U.S.
914 (1979). However, the faculty members pointed out in reply that under New
York law the scope of arbitration is to be judicially determined. Petitioner's
Reply Memorandum at 3, n.* (citing Acting Superintendent v. United Liverpool
Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 510-11, 369 N.E.2d 746, 747, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190
(1977)). The faculty members further pointed outPetitioners' pleadings asserted that the ... collective agreement impermissibly bargained away their constitutional right to contest the
existence of the ground asserted as justifying their dismissals and the
reasonableness of the standards and procedures employed to single
them out for termination. The State's Motion to Dismiss did not contend that the collective agreement allowed review of these questions.
Rather, the State relied upon a theory of waiver of due process: that,
under Antinore v. State of New York ....

it was constitutionally irrel-

evant that Petitioners could not vindicate their constitutional rights.
The State could have moved to dismiss upon the ground that the collective agreement did not foreclose review of the procedures and standards employed to terminate these professors, thereby placing that
question in issue; but, the State did not challenge Petitioners' reading

of the collective agreement. The only question raised and passed upon
below was whether it is constitutionally permissible for a public sector
collective agreement to do just what the parties agreed it did, that is,
waive the individual's constitutional right to due process.
Petitioners' Reply Memorandum at 2.
284. 62 A.D.2d at 588, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 360. The waiver theory was expressly
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Although the Supreme Court has held that one's right to
procedural due process is waivable, the Court has assumed
that standards governing the effectiveness of a due process
waiver in criminal cases also apply in the civil setting. 285 In the
criminal setting, the waiver must be made by the individual
rather than by his legal representative, at least as to fundamental questions of due process. 286 Second, the Court has declared
287 it
that a waiver of due process is not to be lightly implied,
has thus commanded that a waiver, to be effective, must be
both knowing and voluntary. 288 In the civil setting, the requirement of voluntariness has meant that there be at least a rough
289
equality of bargaining power between the parties.
In order to accept the waiver theory under a regime of collective bargaining, however, the requirement of an individualized waiver, as the New York courts fully recognize, must be
abandoned as antithetical to a system of exclusive representation.290 The maintenance of such a requirement would necessirejected in a similar setting by the Nebraska Supreme Court. Brady v. Board of
Trustees, 196 Neb. 226, 242 N.W.2d 616 (1976). It has, however, been approved
by the Kansas Supreme Court. Gorham v. City of Kansas City, 590 P.2d 1051,
1056 (Kan. 1979).
285. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
286. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246 (1973); Brookhart v. Janis,

384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
287. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell TeL Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
288. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-95 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972).

289.

See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v.

Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972).

290. The Appellate Division was fully aware that the individual had not entered into any waiver at all, let alone a voluntary one; thus, it proceeded to
point out that the agreement was a voluntary one on the part of the union, representing "a reciprocal negotiation between forces with strengths on both sides,
reflecting the reconciled interests of employer and employees." 49 A.D.2d at 10,
371 N.Y.S.2d at 217. However, the New York courts have not applied a test of
voluntariness in the constitutional sense, as requiring a finding of equality of
bargaining power. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 528 F.2d 1048, 1050 (5th Cir.
1976) (per curiam).
Curiously, the New York Court of Appeals has allowed an individual
teacher to waive the statutory protection of tenure (as part of a settlement of
outstanding charges for dismissal), relying in part on Antinore; however, the
court subjected the adequacy of the waiver to precisely that showing of voluntariness, in the sense of the absence of duress, that Antinore declined to require of a collective waiver. Abramovich v. Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist.
No. 1, 46 N.Y.2d 450, 414 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1979). (For a discussion of Antinore v.
State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975), affid, 40 N.Y.2d 291, 358 N.E.2d 268,
389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976), see text accompanying notes 274-278 s.upra.)
The application of a constitutional test of voluntariness would rest on an
assumption of complete commonality of interest between the individual and

1980]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

tate a return to the conception of the collective agreement as a
"trade agreement" binding only those who, by their membership in the union and, perhaps, by their vote to ratify the agreement with full appreciation of the consequences, have
voluntarily assented to be bound. The practical effect is that
some would be bound by the agreement and others would not.
However, the transference of the power to waive due process from the individual to a collective cannot be reconciled with
the Constitution. The fourteenth amendment, like the first
amendment, is a limit upon government. "A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority
of the people choose that it be."2 91 It follows that one's right to
due process cannot be infringed simply because a majority of
one's fellow workers choose that it be. The waiver theory
would improperly foreclose scrutiny of whether a governmental
of the limits imposed by
employer has acted in contravention
292
the fourteenth amendment.
b. The Positivist Theory
The positivist theory of the Arnett plurality, 293 put with
the union, and upon the unlikelihood that a relatively strong union would bargain due process away. Insistence on this element of the Supreme Court's construction of the fourteenth amendment would at least prevent the state from
demanding a waiver of constitutional rights in return for merely grudging concessions to which a weak, hard-pressed union might have no practical alternative but to accede. On the relative weakness of the professional staff union of
the State University of New York, see Wollett, State Government-Strategies
for Negotiations in an Austere Environment- A Management Perspective, 27
LAB. L.. 504 (1976), and E. DURYEA & R. FIsK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, THE
STATE UNIvERsrrY AND THE STATE GovERNMENT iN NEW YORK (1975). As the
discussion in Part II amply evidences, however, once the power to waive is
transferred from the individual to the group, considerations extraneous to
those that an individual would take into account in deciding whether to waive
his right to due process are injected into the decisionmaking process. In Antinore, for example, the union's control of access to the arbitration procedure
would heighten the union's power over the individual and thus its power as an
institution. The question of union control of access to arbitration is discussed
at pp. 255-63 infra.
291. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964). See also
West Va. State Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("One's right to
life, liberty, and property... may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.").
292. Cf. Kewin v. Board of Educ., 65 Mich. App. 472, 237 N.W.2d 514 (1975)
(holding impermissible a waiver by collective agreement of the constitutional
right to individualized maternity leave treatment under Cleveland Bd.of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)). See also Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. New
York State Div. of Human Rights, 43 A.D.2d 31, 349 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1973), appeal
dismissed, 33 N.Y.2d 975, 353 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1974).
293. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). See text accompanying notes
247-248 supra.
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customary piquancy by William Van Alstyne, is that "what you
get is what you see. '294 Insofar as state-imposed limits on the
divestiture of the property are part-and-parcel of the property
itself, the employee "must take the bitter with the sweet." 2 95 In
Antinore,296 the New York Court of Appeals also embraced the
positivism of the Arnett plurality. The employee took his job
subject to the collective agreement's provision that determination of cause sufficient for dismissal would be subject to the administration of a grievance-arbitration procedure. In the words
of the New York Appellate Division, he could "no more claim
exemption from the negotiated agreement than may a citizen,
with impunity, withhold compliance with a statute" because he
2 97
disapproved of it.
The fundamental infirmity in the Appellate Division's analogy (wholly apart from the question of whether a majority of
the Court would now fully embrace the positivism that failed to
command a majority in Arnett) 298 is the failure to recognize
that a citizen may claim a statutory benefit while challenging
such portions of the law as may be inconsistent with the Constitution. The court's positivist position refuses to recognize
that the Constitution is a limit on the government when the
government acts as an employer. In function, if not in form, the
positivist position is indistinguishable from the waiver theory.
There is a closely related but, perhaps, more subtle argument implicit in the positivist position. Apart from considerations of equal protection, the legislature's ability to abolish job
security is constitutionally limited only by the contract clause.
Only if the legislature initially intended to be bound by a tenure law as a matter of individual contract would the federal
constitution forbid the state from upsetting that settled expec294. Van Alstyne, supra note 235, at 469.
295. 416 U.S. at 151.
296. Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975), affd, 40 N.Y.2d
921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976). See text accompanying notes 274278 supra.
297. 49 A.D.2d at 11, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
298. William Van Alstyne has argued that the shifting votes on the Court in
later decisions suggests that such a majority has been mustered. Van Alstyne,
supra note 235, at 469 n.74. See also note 250 supra. Professor Van Alstyne's
discussion, however, antedates Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1 (1978) and Barry v. Barchi, 99 S. Ct. 2642 (1979), which subject state pro-

cedures for the divestiture of constitutionally cognizable property interests to
independent scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. These two decisions
cannot be reconciled with the positivist position. See Needleman v. Bohlen, 602
F.2d 1, 4-6 (1st Cir. 1979) (reviewing the question and rejecting the position of

the Arnett plurality).
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tation.299 Because the state conceivably could abolish the right
to continued employment altogether, thereby defeating any
due process claim deriving from statutory tenure, it could be
argued that the state may take the far less drastic action of
merely curtailing some of the incidents of the right to continued employment, such as the right to contest the reasonableness of the standards and procedures employed by the state to
dismiss a tenured professor because of retrenchment.
It does not follow, however, that because the state could, in
some circumstances, totally abrogate tenure, the state is also
free to accord tenure while simultaneously disclaiming fourteenth amendment procedural (or substantive) limitations on
its termination. That the state could decide to abolish a welfare
program, for example, does not imply that the state may condition an individual's welfare benefit by reserving to itself unfettered discretion to summarily terminate the benefit. The fact
that the fourteenth amendment plainly forbids the seemingly
less drastic alternative insures that, given the constitutional requirement of due process, the state must confront the larger
political issue if it wishes to relieve itself of the perceived administrative burden of maintaining a system of job security for
public employees.
c. The Fourteenth Amendment as a Limitation on the
Collective Agreement
The better view is that a public employer's rules contained
in a collective agreement must withstand constitutional examination. From this perspective, the fundamental error in Antinore 30 0 was the misperception of the issue. The authentic
question was whether an arbitration of a dismissal from employment satisfies the minimum constitutional requirement of
an opportunity to be heard. The employee was given notice of
the charges against him and provided a chance to present his
case before a neutral adjudicator prior to dismissal. Thus,
there would seem to be no significant constitutional deficiency
30 1
in the arbitration procedure.
299. The role of the contract clause is treated in greater detail at pp. 263-68.
300. Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d
921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976). See text accompanying notes 274278 supra.

301. See Mills v. Long Island R.R., 515 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1975); Chung v. Park,
514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975). Where, however, the basic elements of fairness are wanting in an arbitration, due process will not have
been afforded. See, e.g., Sedita v. Board of Educ., 82 Misc. 2d 644, 371 N.Y.S.2d
812 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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Accordingly, there remains to be resolved the related question of whether union control of access to arbitration, a common provision in private sector collective agreements, can be
reconciled with the requirement of due process in the public
sector. In Winston v. United States Postal Service,30 2 the Seventh Circuit held that the developed law in the private sector
governing the union's rights and responsibilities in the administation of the grievance-arbitration procedure, when translated
into the public sector, fully satisfied the requirement of due
process. The soundness of the holding, however, remains to be
seen. Through the Postal Reorganization Act, Congress placed
postal workers under the National Labor Relations Act, just as
if they were private sector employees. 30 3 Postal workers are
nevertheless federal employees for constitutional purposes,
and in Winston, a postal worker was held to have a property interest in his job by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement's "just cause" provision. The employee received notice
and a statement of the grounds for discharge. Although he appealed through the various stages of the grievance procedure,
the union ultimately declined to take the discharge to arbitration. The employee sought relief in federal district court charging, in part, a denial of due process. The court of appeals
rejected the positivist reasoning of the Arnett plurality. 30 4 Nevertheless, the court held that the entirety of the procedure satisfied due process requirements:
The exclusive representation of... postal employees in labor-management relations under the PRA [Postal Reorganization Act] is no different from that of private sector employees under the National Labor
Relations Act. Just as in the private sector, the Government has a vital
interest in seeing to it that a union representing government employees has authority to meet its "duty to discountenance disruptive and
frivolous claims" in order to avoid conditions of disorder and instability
which could be disastrous to the economy....
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the grievance procedures
do not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendadopted...
305
ment.
302. 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978). The case concerned nonpreference-eligible
employees. Preference-eligible employees were given a statutory election of
remedies, not applicable in this case. The Sixth Circuit had held that a voluntary election of remedies by the employee avoids the due process problem.
Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 526 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1975). Winston was
approved, albeit in dictum, in Stritzl v. United States Postal Serv., 602 F.2d 249
(10th Cir. 1979).
303. 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1209 (1976).
304. Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 585 F.2d 198, 209 n.30 (7th Cir.
1978). For a discussion of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), see text accompanying notes 247-248 supra.
305. 585 F.2d at 210 (quoting Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp.
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Thus, the decision ultimately rests on the assumption that due
process is satisfied by the mere availability of a suit against the
in refusing
union for breach of the duty of fair representation
30 6
to pursue the grievance to arbitration.
In the private sector, the union customarily controls access
to arbitration under the grievance procedure. If it declines to
proceed to arbitration, the employee may sue the employer for
breach of the collective agreement only if he can show that the
union also breached the duty of fair representation in dealing
with his case. As the Court made clear in Vaca v. Sipes, 30 7 the
duty of fair representation does not obligate the union to pursue every grievance to arbitration. The union may not, however, "arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in
perfunctory fashion."3 08 The dismissed employee secures no relief, for example, if the union can show that it diligently investigated the case and consistently applied its announced policy to
pursue to arbitration only those discharges that, in good faith,
the union believed had a better-than-even chance of being reversed, even if it is ultimately determined that the dismissal
was in fact not for just cause.3 0 9
The result in Winston cannot be reconciled with the court's
ostensible rejection of the plurality view in Arnett. The fifth
amendment's command that an employee be given a hearing
782, 791 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849

(1960)).

306. "Although their representative declined their request to demand arbitration, appellants could have sued the Union for breach of its duty to fairly
represent them if the refusal to demand arbitration was not in good faith." Id.
307. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
308. Id. at 191.
309. Id. at 192-93. In a subsequent postal workers case, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that the merit of the grievance is not dispositive of the fair representation issue. Melendy v. United States Postal Serv., 589 F.2d 256, 258-59 (7th
Cir. 1978) ("The collective bargaining agreement... places control of the grievance in the union once it leaves the local work level, not in the employee. It is
the union that continues the grievance, but only when in its judgment further
processing is in the common good."). As one study observed of the role of local
officers in the evaluation of grievances:
In responding to the demands made upon them, the officers must develop some system of priority. Many grievances are contradictory (particularly where there are conflicting group interests), some are
unjustified, and all require time, energy, and the expenditure of the
union's limited bargaining power. Only a few will have strategic importance to the union as a whole.
Before deciding what to do with a grievance, the officers must consider its possible ramifications upon (1) political relationships within
the local itself (2) the union's relationship with management, and (3)
the amount of support the members will provide in pushing the case.
L. SAmEs & G. STRAuss, THE LocAL UNIoN 40 (rev. ed. 1967).
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on the ground asserted for discharge is not satisfied by a suit
that tests the union's diligence, consistency and good faith in
declining to afford him a hearing on the merits of his discharge.
Winston would be in accord with the fifth amendment only if a
subsequent finding of merit in the employee's grievance would
constitute a per se breach of the duty of fair representationthat is, if the law of fair representation in the public sector
were to adopt the position
expressly rejected in the private sec3 10
tor by Vaca v. Sipes.
In sharp contrast to the Seventh Circuit, one commentator
has argued that in order to sustain union control of access to
arbitration in the public sector, the due process requirement
must apply to the union's handling of the grievance-arbitration
procedure. 311 Under this reasoning, the union's institutional
role in the procedure becomes "state action" subject to regulation by the Constitution. In essence, the union's decision not to
pursue a grievance to arbitration would have to be reached after the practical equivalent of a hearing on the merits. Although the argument has superficial appeal, the result should
give pause, for it contemplates nothing less than judicial regulation by that bluntest of regulatory instruments-the Constitution-of a union's day-to-day administration of the grievancearbitration procedure.
Some states have obviated the problem by making breach
of the collective agreement an unfair labor practice to be litigated before a public tribunal, or by constituting a public tribunal as the adjudicator of all contract grievances to which any
individual grievant may have resort. 312 Although these devices
310. The thrust of David Feller's magisterial article, A GeneralTheory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALiF. L. REv. 663 (1973), is that, absent
agreement to the contrary, a collective agreement in the private sector creates
no judicially enforceable rights in the individuals governed by them; thus, the
individual's sole recourse in the event of employer noncompliance with a provision of a collective agreement is suit against the union for breach of the duty of
fair representation in the administration of the grievance-arbitration procedure.
That argument is congruent with the positivist position in the public sector. Although the Supreme Court could adopt the Feller position in the private sector,
under the position advanced here, it could not do so in the public sector.
311. Note, Public Sector Grievance Procedures,Due Process,and the Duty of
FairRepresentation,89 HARv. L. REV. 752, 780-88 (1976).
312. Section 926 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated gives the individual the
right to appeal all grievances to the Vermont Labor Relations Board, and a
grievance is defined under Section 902(14) to include a departure from the collective agreement as well as from an agency's rules. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§§902(14), 926 (Supp. 1979). See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §273-A&5(I)(h)
(1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 3-18-15.2 (Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 3-18-15.1 (1974). Minnesota provides for an election of remedies by civil service employees. MmN. STAT. § 179.70 (Supp. 1979).
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avoid the constitutional issue, they also preclude the union
from winnowing and sifting the myriad of grievances presented
to it, a function that in the private sector has been thought an
important part of the collective bargaining process. 313 If, as in
the private sector, the public sector collective agreement represents a set of management rules, and if, as in the private sector,
arbitration under the collective agreement is the preferred
means of resolving disputes arising under those rules, it should
follow that, at least as to grievances presenting questions of
group interest, the union should have the authority to select
those cases it believes will best develop the common law of the
agreement, subject to its duty of fair representation.
A more refined approach, better attuned to both constitutional doctrine and the practicalities of labor relations, must
distinguish those provisions of a collective agreement that create interests protected by the due process clause. The argument for the application of the due process clause to the
union's administration of the grievance procedure is built on
the assumption that a public employee has a property interest
in every provision of the collective agreement-that is, that the
terms of every contract with the state constitute "property" for
constitutional purposes, such that any failure by the state to
comply would be unconstitutional. 314 But the validity of that
assumption remains to be seen. Assume, for example, that a
school board adopts a rule that class size shall not exceed
twenty-five students. A teacher is assigned a class with thirtyfive students. Whatever administrative remedy might be available as a matter of state law, the assignment of an excessive
number of students would surely not raise a question of constitutional dimension. The result should not differ if the rule were
expressly embodied in the individual teacher's contract of employment nor should it differ if the rule were contained in a col313. Feller, supra note 8, at 752-55.
314. See Note, supra note 311, at 773 ("a broad range of employment benefits in which a grievant has more than a unilateral expectation of entitlement
may be expected to be covered by due process"). Two observers have argued
to similar effect. "The breadth of the judicial decisions in this area strongly
supports the conclusion that, when squarely confronted with the question, the
courts will hold that a collective bargaining agreement between a public employer and a union representing that employer's public employees is sufficient
to vest in those employees a constitutionally protected property interest in the
employment conditions it establishes." Baird & McArthur, ConstitutionalDue
Process and the Negotiation of Grievance Proceduresin Public Employment, 5
J.L. & EDuC. 209, 212 (1976). The cases cited, however, do not strongly support
that conclusion; rather, the decisions primarily concern the right to the job, and
not to all the rules that might be contained in a collective agreement.
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lective agreement with the school board that also reserved to
the union the power to take to arbitration all cases involving alleged failure to comply with the rules. This seems to be the
315
sense of Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft:
The Fourteenth Amendment places procedural constraints on the
actions of government that work a deprivation of interests enjoying the
stature of "property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Although the underlying substantive interest is created by "an independent source ... ." federal constitutional law determines whether

that interest rises to the level of a "legitimate
claim of entitlement"
31
protected by the Due Process Clause.

The sources that give rise to a property interest may include not only the employer's established rules, but long-standing practices and informal understandings as well.
Accordingly, unless one were to adopt the positivist position
317 courtverbally rejected but tacitly accepted by the Winston
that a collective agreement creates no constitutionally protected interest but only guarantees that individual grievances
will be treated consistently with the duty of fair representation-it is as appropriate to look to the terms of a collective
agreement as to these other sources in order to determine
whether the individual had a property interest sufficient to trigger a requirement of due process. 318 The positivist position
315. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
316. Id. at 9 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 .(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)). This distinction
is illustrated in a recent decision of the Tenth Circuit concerning the termination of a tenured professor due to financial exigency. The institution had terminated the tenured professor while retaining more "versatile" nontenured
teachers, and continued to offer courses that the tenured teacher was fully
competent to teach. This action, he asserted, was inconsistent with the tenure
system which, by definition, accords the tenured teacher a legal preference in
retention over the nontenured so long as the tenured teacher is competent to
teach remaining class offerings. There was no challenge either to the existence
of a bona fide financial exigency or to the procedures used to single the teacher
out for termination; thus, the question perceived by the court was one of substantive due process, i.e., whether the institution had arbitrarily deprived the
professor of property. Whether tenure did accord such a preference, the court
stated, "essentially is a matter of simple contract law for state court interpretation .... It is enough to note that the interpretation applied by the college's
administrative officials in selecting the criteria for deciding which faculty members would be terminated was sufficiently reasonable to put to rest any claim
that their decision was [unconstitutionally] arbitrary or capricious." Brenna v.
Southern Colo. State College, 589 F.2d 475, 477 (10th Cir. 1978). In sum, the
reach of the fourteenth amendment is not coextensive with the protection accorded by the individual's contract.
317. Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978). See
text accompanying notes 302-306 supra.
318. Compare Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 426 F. Supp. 1272, 1286 (D. DeL
1976) with New Castle-Gunning Bedford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 421 F.
Supp. 960 (D. Del. 1976).
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would produce the anomaly that although an employer rule, or
even an informal understanding, according an individual tenure
would carry with it constitutional limitations on his termination, the same rule incorporated in a collective agreement
would not. The fact that the property interest is created by collective agreement as opposed to some other source is surely irrelevant for constitutional purposes; the critical distinction is
that the property interest that rises to the level of constitutional protection is an interest in the job itself, not an interest
in the ancillary incidents and myriad of work rules surrounding
the job. Just as the Court would distinguish from among provisions of an agency's regulations and other sources governing
employment those entitlements that rise to a level protected by
the Constitution,3 1 9 so too must a court distinguish such entitlements from among the provisions of the collective agreements. 320 If it is determined that such provisions create an
entitlement to the job, whether the terms derive from the collective agreement, directly from the state laws, or from informal understanding, Roth321 and Sindermann322 command that
the employee be afforded due process in the termination of employment.
Once the scope of the due process issue is narrowed, the
problem becomes more manageable. In Carey v. Piphus,323 the
Court stated that the due process clause protects persons "not
from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 324 It follows that it is a de319. Needleman v. Bohlen, 602 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) (contract right to salary
increment constitutes property); Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1977) (no
property interest in assignment); Schwartz v. Thompson, 497 F.2d 430, 433 (3d

Cir. 1977) (no property interest in promotion unless it is "virtually a matter of
right"),followed in Colim v. Vance, 567 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
320. See, e.g., Gordon v. Anker, 444 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Gordon, a
guidance counselor alleged that the failure to assign duties to her within her
licensed area, in contravention of a collective agreement, contravened due process. The court disagreed:

That she is not now working as a guidance counselor is unfortunate,
but does not amount to a federal claim. In fact, it may well be that "absent termination of... employment, an 'interest' in employment does
not rise to the level of a property ... right constitutionally protected
by due process."
Id. at 52 (quoting Teachers United for Fair Treatment v. Anker, 76 Civ. 283
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,1977)).
321. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See text
accompanying notes 245-246 supra.
322. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See text accompanying notes

245-246 supra.
323. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).

324. Id. at 259.
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fense to a due process challenge that the employee would have
been discharged or suspended even if a hearing had been afforded.325 In a case involving deprivation of a constitutionally
protected interest that the union declines to pursue to arbitration (and does not permit the individual to pursue to arbitration on his own behalf), the employee may nevertheless sue
the public employer for an unconstitutional deprivation, in
which case the court would have to determine the merits of the
dismissal. It should be no defense for the public employer to
assert that the union declined to afford a hearing, because a
wrongful termination would still be constitutionally infirm.
The Court also recognized that another purpose of "procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that
the government has dealt with him fairly, as well as to mini'3 26
mize the risk of mistaken deprivation of protected interests.

Accordingly, the Court allowed recovery of those damages that
the individual could prove to have resulted from the denial of
procedural due process, distinct from damages caused by the
deprivation of the constitutionally protected property interest.3 2 7 To the extent that the failure to supply due process re-

sulted from the union's refusal to proceed to arbitration, the
public employer should be able to implead the union as a defendant on the theory that the union should be liable for so
much of the damages as flowed not from the dismissal but from
the union's refusal to take the case to arbitration. By the same
token, if the employee prevails on the merits of his dismissal,
the union should nevertheless be held liable for so much of the
damages as the individual can prove to have resulted from the
refusal to proceed to arbitration.
Not every provision of a public sector collective agreement
rises to the level of constitutional property. Thus, the union's
role in the administration of the grievance procedure involving
the bulk of a public employer's work rules, a role thought indispensable to the private sector system of collective bargaining,
can be fully translated into the public sector. Furthermore,
where the merits of suspension, dismissal or other deprivation
of a constitutionally cognizable property interest are uncertain
or even arguable, it would simply be in the interest of the employer (and the union) to afford due process. The union could
325. Id. at 260.
326. Id. at 262.
327. For example, the Court indicates that a plaintiff could collect damages
for the mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of due process. Id.
at 261-64.
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easily agree that in such cases the grievant would have the individual right to proceed to arbitration. Unlike decisions concerning whether to arbitrate grievances that implicate group
interests, e.g., class size, questions of deprivation of constitutionally protected property tend to turn upon individual factual
determinations. Thus, in such cases, the erosion of the union's
exclusive control of access to arbitration does little violence to
the rationale for that control.
In sum, the fact that a public employer's rules (including
those rules incorporated into a collective agreement) must
withstand constitutional scrutiny has serious, but limited, implications for the administration of a public sector contractual
grievance-arbitration procedure. In cases in which a grievance
implicates no constitutionally protected property interest, the
developed law of the private sector would apply without modification. In cases in which a grievance does implicate a constitutionally protected property interest but the case has been
arbitrated, the due process clause will have been satisfied so
long as there was no fundamental deficiency in the arbitration
procedure. Finally, in cases in which a grievance does concern
the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest and has
not been arbitrated, the scheme of rights and liabilities adopted
in Carey v. Piphus would apply. This approach goes far to
meet the test, addressed earlier, for assessing the soundness of
any legal theory- 328 it allows solutions to be derived from it; the
solutions it produces are more satisfactory than those that
would result without it; and it conforms to the principles announced by the Supreme Court.
3.

The Contract Clause

The prior analysis has explored two areas, the first and
fourteenth amendments; there is at least some texture to the
decisional law governing the role of these amendments under a
regime of public sector collective bargaining. That the Constitution limits what a governmental employer may accomplish by
collective agreement, just as it limits what he may accomplish
by unilaterally promulgated rules, can be further measured
against a constitutional provision that should be expected to
supply a rich ground for future litigation.
The contract clause prohibits the states from making any
law impairing the obligations of a contract, 329 including any
328. See text accompanying note 205 supra.
329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cL 1.
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contract made with the state itself. Analysis in contract clause
cases must address several questions: first, whether a contract

exists; second, whether the state could permissibly limit itself
by the particular term or terms of the contract; third, whether a
law impairs the contract's obligations; and fourth, whether the
law is nevertheless permissible as a necessary exercise of public power.
The existence of a contract is a federal question. It would
scarcely be consistent with the function of the contract clause
as a limit on the power of the states to allow the state to avoid
impairment questions merely by having the state declare one's
relationship to the state to be noncontractual.3 30 Insofar as the
terms of the contract are supplied by statute, however, the
Supreme Court has required a showing that the legislature intended the law to comprise part of the individual's contract,
rather than merely to declare a policy that a subsequent legislature would be free to repeal. Where, for example, public
school teachers hold tenure pursuant to statute, the elimination
of the employer's obligation by repeal of the tenure law raises
no impairment question unless it is first determined that the
legislature intended the tenure law to comprise a contract with
each employee. 331 It has been suggested that instances of such
legislative intention are relatively rare. 332 Nevertheless, a collective agreement made by a public agency pursuant to the
power delegated to it by the legislature under a public em330. See Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 433 (1829). Cf. Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[A] State
cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking
property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all."). Apparently Mr. Justice Stewart, who joined the plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
(see text accompanying notes 247-248 supra), saw no inconsistency in having
the state's determination of whether a public employee has "property" in his
job be dispositive of the fourteenth amendment issue. For a statement of how
far a state court may go under Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), see Gardner
v. Talley, 373 N.E.2d 175, 176-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
331. Compare Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104-08 (1938)
(holding that a state tenure act gave a permanent teacher the contractual right
to continued employment, such that a repeal of the act constituted an unconstitutional impairment) with Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)
(holding that a state statute did not create contracts with individual teachers,
but merely placed limitations on boards of education with respect to tenure
and salary decisions). The cases are collected at Annot., 147 A.LR 293-94
(1943).
332. Blair, Union Security Agreements in PublicEmployment, 60 CoRNELL L.
REV. 183, 207-08 (1975) (tenure laws). See also Note, Public Employee Pensions
in Times of Fiscal Distress,90 HARv. L. REV. 992, 993-94 n.8 (1977) (listing the
minority of jurisdictions where pensions are a contractual obligation of the
state).
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ployee collective bargaining law333 might alter an individual's
contract to his disadvantage, either by dealing with a subject
covered by the individual's existing contract (e.g., salary or
classification), or by dealing with a subject governed by a statute that was intended to enjoy contractual status (e.g., retirement benefits).334 In such cases, the appropriate question
would be whether the impairment was nevertheless justified as
a necessary exercise of public power, assuming that the previnot impermissibly invade the
ous contractual commitment 3did
35
state's reserved police power.
333. The Court has earlier made it plain that a city ordinance, or an order of
a state administrative agency, issued pursuant to authority delegated by the
legislature, is to be considered a "law" for the purposes of the contract clause.
E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555 (1914); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 318 (1913). So, too, the provisions of a
collective agreement made pursuant to authority delegated by the legislature to
supersede individual contracts should be considered "law" for that purpose.
334. For example, under the New York Constitution, "Membership in any
pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7. Accordingly, New York City could not alter its
rules for reentry into the City retirement system to the detriment of a retired
employee, prior to the date of his reentry. Donner v. New York City Retirement Sys., 33 N.Y.2d 413, 417, 308 N.E.2d 896, 897, 353 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1975).
However, in Schacht v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 28, 346 N.E.2d 518, 382
N.Y.S.2d 717 (1976), the city reclassified the plaintiff as a managerial employee,
resulting in a significant loss of pension benefits. Id. at 31, 346 N.E.2d at 518-19,
382 N.Y.S.2d at 718. The trial court stated that a personnel order (for example,
a reclassification or change in retirement age) is a term and condition of employment which is not a contractual commitment under the retirement system
even though such orders have incidental effects upon the retirement benefits
ultimately received. Schacht v. City of New York, 79 Misc. 2d 457, 460, 359
N.Y.S.2d 952, 955-56 (Sup. Ct. 1974). The court went on to hold, however, that
plaintiff's reclassification was made pursuant to agreement with the union that
represented her and so her contract rights had been "waived." Id. at 461, 79
Misc. 2d 359 N.Y.S.2d at 956. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the
latter ground. "Plaintiff, having designated the union to be her agent for collective bargaining purposes, is bound by agreements made by that union on her
behalf She may not reject certain acts of her bargaining representative and accept others." 39 N.Y.2d at 32, 346 N.E.2d at 519, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 718. Judge
Fuchsberg dissented on the ground that the "waiver" was not at all clear. Id. at
32, 34, 346 N.E.2d at 519-20, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
The trial court may have been correct on the first ground of its decision;
but, in terms of the analysis offered here, the "waiver" theory is plainly unconstitutional as applied by the court of appeals. Interestingly, Judge Fuchsberg
suggests that an element of an effective waiver is a showing that "the employees affected, knew or should have known that the waiver of rights already
earned and vested were intended to become subject to unilateral divestiture by
the employer." Id. at 33, 346 N.E.2d at 519, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 719. This observation, which would have salvaged the city's action, assumes that the employee
could have opted out of the change; thus, implicit in the observation is the rejection of the principle of exclusive representation insofar as the relinquishment of a vested right is concerned.
335. In the nineteenth century, for example, the power delegated by the leg-
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The argument against the finding of an impermissible impairment would proceed by analogy to the law in the private
sector. The Court in JI. Case336 plainly contemplated that a
collective agreement negotiated pursuant to the Labor Act
could supersede an individual's contract to his disadvantage;
that power is subject, under Steele, 337 to the union's duty of fair
representation in the making of the collective agreement. Furthermore, although the contract clause, by its terms, is a limit
only on states and not upon the federal government, the fifth
amendment has been held to limit the federal legislature's ability to impair private contracts, analogous to the contract
clause's limitation on state power.3 38 Pursuing this analogy, it
could be argued that the very same policies that Congress has
determined reasonably allow the impairment of individual contracts of private employment similarly operate to allow impair3 39
ment of individual contracts of public employment.
There are two reasons why this analogy is misplaced. First,
prior to the Labor Act, individual employment contracts giving
any real rights to employees were virtually nonexistent; the individual contract was often an effort to defeat unionization. Accordingly, the Labor Act was predicated on the gross disparity
of bargaining power between employees and employers and
the lack of "full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract"34° in the private sector. In the public sector, however,
islature to run state institutions was held to preclude the institution from binding itself by employment of a specified duration, Gillan v. Board of Regents, 88
Wis. 7, 13, 58 N.W. 1042, 1044 (1894), or even to commit itself to afford so much
as three months of notice of termination. Devol v. Board of Regents, 6 Ariz. 259,
262-63, 56 P. 737, 738 (1899). The logic (or illogic) of these cases survived, in
some parts of the country, as late as the mid-1950s. See Posin v. Board of
Higher Educ., 86 N.W.2d 31, 36 (N.D. 1957); Worzella v. Board of Regents, 77 S.D.
447, 450-51, 93 N.W.2d 411, 413 (1958). In Texas, the nineteenth century posture
seems to survive even today. Fazekas v. University of Houston, 565 S.W.2d 299
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978), appeal dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 1487 (1979). For the contemporary view, however, see Pima College v. Sinclair, 17 Ariz. App. 213, 214-15, 496
P.2d 639, 640-41 (1972) and Zimmerman v. Minot State College, 198 N.W. 2d 108,
117-18 (N.D. 1972).
336. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See text accompanying notes
10-18 supra.
337. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
338. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1955).
339. In fact, the Board in J.I Case justified its position by adverting to the
then leading decision on permissible state impairment of private contracts. J.L
Case Co., 42 N..RLB. 85, 96 n.11 (1942) (citing Home Bldg. &Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)), enforced as modified, NLRB v. J.L Case Co., 134 F.2d
70 (7th Cir. 1943), affirmed and modified on unrelated grounds, 321 U.S. 332
(1944).
340. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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the constitutional rights of association and speech, and the employees' ability to influence the decisions of their governmental
employer through the political process, give them far greater
protection than their private sector counterparts had in the absence of the Labor Act. As a result, there may be a contract to
impair in the public sector while there customarily was not in
the private sector.
Second and far more important, the Court has made plain
that "[t]here is a clear distinction between the power of the
Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties
when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the
substance of its own engagements."' 34 1 The Court's recent revivification of the contract clause in United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey342 pursued that reasoningAs with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impair-

ment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve
an important public purpose. In applying this standard, however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and ne-

cessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at
stake.343

Accordingly, the fundamental infirmity of the analogy to
the private sector is that it would allow the state by negotiation
with a majority representative to take back a right it had earlier
granted, by mere reference to the reasonableness of providing
for a system of collective bargaining rather than by showing the
overriding public end served by the particular impairment. To
the extent the state is acting to impair the obligations of contracts made with the state, however, United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey requires an assessment of the reasonableness and
necessity of the precise impairment. If, for example, the state
bargains to eliminate tenure, S4 it must show, irrespective of
the generalized purposes served by the system of collective
bargaining, i.e., allowing special access by employees to participate in the formulation of management's rules, that the abrogation of tenure was justified by an overriding public need
impossible to achieve by less drastic means.
341.
342.

Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1955).
431 U.S. 1 (1977).

343. Id. at 25-26.
344. That this example is not entirely fanciful is illustrated by the following
provision (reproduced in its entirety) of a public sector collective agreement:
' Tenure is eliminated." Agreement between the University of Alaska and the
Alaska Community College's Federation of Teachers, Local 2404, § 7.4(g) (Aug.
5, 1974) (under heading "Layoff Nonretentions, and Terminations") (on ifie

with the author).
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In sum, analysis under the contract clause supports the
general proposition that government may not justify merely by
reference to an agreement with a majority representative, action that the Constitution forbids government to take. This
reading of the clause does little real violence to the system of
public sector collective bargaining. Some contract rights may
be insulated, even in the private sector, from disposition by the
majority. 345 The scope of public sector bargaining may be more
narrowly circumscribed because of the perceived consequences
of an expanded bargaining agenda upon democratic processes.
In the case of the contract clause, the resulting limitation on
the scope of what the parties may agree to, or on what government may demand at the bargaining table, flows from the constitutional requirement for government to show that some
overriding public need is being served when an individual is
divested of a contract right government had heretofore accorded.
C.

FAIR

REPRESENTATION AND PUBLIC ORDERING

Professors Koretz and Rabin have observed, in commenting on Antinore,346 that,
Waiver of constitutional rights should be looked upon askance, espe345. See Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157 (1971), discussed in note 46 supra.
In Kolcum v. Board of Educ., 335 A.2d 618 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), the court
held that an accrued benefit (reimbursement for moving expenses) had vested,
and so was insulated from disposition by the collective. Id. at 622. The court
reasoned,
The clear purpose of a bargaining unit under the circumstances here
present was to establish an agreement as to working conditions and
pay scales which would be the consideration in return for the performance of services to be rendered in the future. Individual rights which
are to accrue on the basis of future services rendered in his professional capacity as a teacher are usually bargaining tools within reach of
the negotiators. These rights connected with services yet to be rendered may be modified or altered for the benefit of the larger body.
However, where a minority of teachers have special accrued rights
from past performance, there is not a valid bargaining connection between these vested rights and the securing of a favorable pact for the
rendition of future services by the entire body of teachers.
Id. at 623. The distinction, apart from the Court's cryptic footnote in Chemical
& Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971), see
note 46 supra, is difficult to square with the law in the private sector; thus, the
case is better read simply as avoiding a serious problem by a narrow reading of
the collective agreement. If, however, the collective agreement did what the
school board asserts it to have done, then a question of impermissible impairment would be raised.
346. Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975), affd, 40 N.Y.2d
921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976). See text accompanying notes 274278 supra.
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cially when individual rights are extinguished by group action. Until
our courts develop sophisticated doctrines for reviewing the adequacy
of fair representation in the public sector, courts should be wary of expedient solutions. A union's freedom to make choices between different groups and interests should be more carefully circumscribed than
in the private sector, since such decisions may affect preexisting statutory and constitutional rights. 3 4 7

The tacit assumption of this otherwise sobering caution is that
relinquishment of individual constitutional rights might be permissible when subject to a suitably sophisticated doctrine of
fair representation. From this, it would follow that the collective's relinquishment of an antecedent individual contractual
right occasions no impairment problem so long as the duty of
fair representation is adhered to. Apart from the problem of
defining a suitably "sophisticated" doctrine, 348 the commentators' assumption misapprehends the distinctly different character of analysis in the two sectors.
As the concluding section of Part II pointed out, the duty of
fair representation in the making of collective agreements is an
outer limit on the extent to which a majority may advantage itself at the expense of a minority when framing the rules in a
collective agreement. This duty limits the union's conduct, not
the employer's. The Constitution, however, is a limit upon government as employer. Accordingly, a collective agreement in
the public sector must survive scrutiny under both the duty of
fair representation and the Constitution. Inasmuch as one taproot of the duty of fair representation is the analogy to the
equal protection clause, the results under the duty and the
equal protection clause may overlap where a contractual distinction between groups in the bargaining unit is at stake. The
questions posed by the two differ, however, and the results
may not always coincide. The differences (and similarities)
347. Koretz & Rabin, 1975 Survey of New York Law: Labor Relations Law,
27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 159 (1976).
348. After reviewing the cases, Professor Aaron concludes that
[a] lthough it might be argued that in the public sector the bargaining
representative's duty of fair representation should be enforced more
strictly than in the private sector, the courts have so far shown no inclination to do so. The reason, as I have indicated, is that the duty has its
roots in the Constitution; so the difference between the public and pri-

vate sectors that we observed in respect of procedural due process
does not exist regarding fair representation. Further refinements in
the law governing the duty of fair representation-for example, in the
standards for determining whether the duty has been breached-are
therefore likely to continue to be made in private-sector cases and then
adopted in the public sector.
Aaron, ProceduralDue Process and the Duty of Fair Representation in Public
Sector GrievanceDisputes, in LABoR RELATIONS LAw iN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 179,
195-98 (A. Knapp ed. 1977).
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can best be explored by returning to the illustrations discussed
at the outset of Part III.
A case of academicfreedom.349 A collective agreement in
the private sector under which a school administration could
select instructional material and forbid teacher reference to
any source not so selected would not breach the duty of fair
representation. Assuming the term disadvantaged a majority,
such a provision would not present a valid fair representation
issue under proposition (1). 3 50 On the other hand, assuming
that the disadvantage was not shared by a majority-that is,
that the rule adversely affected a minority of teachers who
cared to exercise academic freedom, but did not disadvantage a
docile or indifferent majority-the rule would nevertheless appear to be a uniform one, consistent with proposition (5).351
Moreover, the fact that the employer insisted on the term as a
condition of agreement would militate against any conclusion
that by agreeing, the union had breached the duty. None of
this is relevant in the public sector for the simple reason that
the first amendment prohibits such a rule, whether promulgated unilaterally by a school board or embodied in a collective
agreement with the teachers' union. In the public sector, such
an agreement would be permissible as a matter of fair representation, but unconstitutional.
A case of changing rules.352 On the face of it, the employer

merely adopted a uniform rule, adding a sanction for employee
noncompliance with employment policy; if this had been done
pursuant to a collective agreement in the private sector, even to
the discomfiture of employees who had relied on the prior rule,
there would be no breach of the duty of fair representation
under proposition (5).353 In the public sector, the disparate impact of the rule change gives rise to no valid equal protection
claim. 35

In this case, the results under fair representation and

equal protection coincide. As the Supreme Court implied, however, the case would have been different had it concerned the
retroactive application of a new penalty to prior employee conduct. In this case as well, the results in the public and private
sectors would coincide, but only where the union sought the
349.
350.
351.

See pp. 241-42 supra.
See p. 210 supra.
See p. 220 supra.

352. See p. 244 supra.
353. See p. 220 supra. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printin
Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451, 454 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussed in note 179
supra).
354. Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
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change. Were the union reluctantly to have yielded to a public
employer's strongly held bargaining position, the results would
diverge. Union action so predicated might be considered a
breach of the duty of fair representation in the private sector;355 a public sector agreement doing so would in the Tenth

Circuit's view, also be unconstitutional.
A case of terminationof tenure.356 Of relevance to the 1inancial exigency" case, Di Lorenzo v. Carey,357 is the fact that
a coalition composed of nontenured faculty (who may have had
an interest in facilitating the elimination of tenured positions)
and nonfaculty administrators (who were not eligible for academic tenure) constituted a majority in the State University
bargaining unit, which was willing to bargain away some of the
protection afforded by tenure to secure other concessions. 35 81
Were such a case to arise in the private sector, the outcome
would be dictated by the source of the bargaining demand. Assuming that tenure is not a "vested" contract right insulated
from disposition by the majority, 359 it could be argued that tenure is, one of these "individual advantages" that, under JI.
Case,360 may be subsumed to the larger good.361 Nevertheless,
proposition (3)362 limits a majority's ability to expropriate, or,
in this context, abrograte an important interest of the minority
solely to advantage itself. Accordingly, had the majority (coalition) decided on its own initiative to abrogate such an interest,
a significant fair representation question would be presented.
From what is known of the SUNY negotiations, however, the
coalition was acting in response to the employer's demand for
greater administrative flexibility in dealing with retrenchment
than was possible under the existing tenure system. The sacri355.

See, e.g., Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935, 939-42 (9th

Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968) (claim that the union based de-registration upon prior conduct that was not grounds for de-registration at the time
it was committed, was held to state a cause of action for breach of the duty of
fair representation).
356. See p. 242 supra.
357. 62 A.D.2d 583, 405 N.Y.S.2d 356, appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 832, 409
N.Y.S.2d 212 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Farrell v. Carey, 440 U.S. 914 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 279-284 supra.
358. Finkin, Book Review, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 232 (1974).
359. See notes 46, 345 supra.
360. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See text accompanying notes
10-18 supra.

361. Menard, "May Tenure Rights ofFaculty Be BargainedAway?", 2 J. C. &
UNiv. L. 256 (1975). Mr. Menard answers in the affirmative the question posed
by the title of his article. The discussion evidences awareness of neither the
duty of fair representation nor the constitutional problems in the public sector.
362. See p. 215 supra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64.183

fice of the minority's interest in those circumstances would militate against a finding of breach of the duty, at least where the
3
union may have had no realistic alternative to acquiescence. 63
The analysis radically changes in the public sector. Even if
the Court were ultimately fully to embrace the positivist reasoning of the Arnett364 plurality, thereby obviating due process

analysis of the terms of the collective agreement, the contract
clause would still limit what the state can accomplish by collective agreement. In order to demand a partial abrogration of academic tenure, at least where the award of tenure antedates
the collective agreement, the state would have to show more
than mere agreement by the majority representative-the state
would also have to show that the abrogation was a necessary
response to a public emergency. 65 More important, the positiv363. In Belen v. Woodbridge Township Bd. of Educ., 142 N.J. Super. 486, 362
A.2d 47 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), of the one thousand members of the bargaining unit, six were psychologists working in teams with learning disability
teachers and social workers. Id. at 489, 362 A.2d at 48-49. Psychologists received a 25% premium above the salary scale and other team members a lesser
differential. The union sought to maintain the 25% differential for psychologists and to give the same differential to the other team members. The School
Board agreed to equalization but at a 10% level Id. at 489, 362 A.2d at 49. After
impasse, the parties accepted a fact-finder's recommendation of parity at a 15%
level. Id. at 489-90, 362 A.2d at 49. The court found no breach of the duty of fair
representation because the union "did not act in bad faith and ... its actions
were not deceptive, arbitrary or misleading." Id. at 492, 362 A.2d at 50. Had the
union sought the change, the question would be whether the reduction in the
differential constituted a partial expropriation in contravention of proposition
(3), see p. 215 supra, or a permissible refusal to advance the minority's interests under proposition (4), see p. 217 supra; but, that question need not be
reached, for the simple reason that the union did not breach the duty of fair
representation by accepting a fact-finder's recommendation that accommodates
the employer's strongly held bargaining position.
364. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). See text accompanying notes
247-248 supra.
365. In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.), the Court sustained legislation providing for the composition of the
obligations of defaulting municipalities against impairment challenge. Id. at
507-10. The legislative scheme required that 85% of the creditors approve. Id.
at 506-07. The Court held that the provision was a reasonable response to a
genuine public emergency. Id. at 510-11. The Court relied upon its earlier decision in Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935) (Cardozo, J.), concerning a statute that
provided for court-ordered bank reopening upon petition of three-fourths of the
bank's creditors. 316 U.S. at 513-14. In Doty, the Court stated.
The argument will not hold that the necessary operation of the statute
is to subject dissenting creditors, who may be as many as one-fourth, to
the will or the whim of the assenting three-fourths. The creditors
favoring reorganization, though they be ninety-nine per cent, have no
power under the statute to impose their will on a minority. They may
advise and recommend, but they are powerless to coerce. Their recommendation will be ineffective unless approved by the Superintendent.
Even if approved by him, it will be ineffective unless the court after a
hearing shall find it to be wise and just. Upon such a hearing every ob-
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ist view has not commanded an unequivocal majority of the
Court. Accordingly, it would be irrelevant that the union acted
in accordance with the duty of fair representation in making
the concession. If, for example, a majority of the unit were tenured faculty and it was clear that they approved the agreement
with full awareness of its terms, the agreement would nevertheless have to withstand constitutional scrutiny. According to
the Appellate Division in Di Lorenzo, the collective agreement
provided that during retrenchment, a professor who has tenure-that archetypical property-could not contest in any forum the existence of the conditions alleged to justify his
termination, the reasonableness of the standards, or the procedures employed to single him out for termination. Such a set of
rules, when adopted by a public employer, violates the due
process clause. The rules are no less unconstitutional when incorporated into a collective agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The American system of collective bargaining provides a
means of employee participation, through a majority representative, in the formulation of the rules governing the job. The
system, so understood, may be translated from the private to
the public sectors, but it is subject to different constraints in
the two settings. Although the scope of agreement in the private sector has been increasingly encroached upon by positive
law, particularly by antidiscrimination legislation, a basic limitation on what the parties may accomplish by collective agreement still lies in the union's duty of fair representation. This
limitation primarily concerns the union's responsibility to the
group it represents, and affects employers only secondarily.
The practical effect of finding a breach of the duty in contract
making is the excision of a contract term; that is, the partial
making (or unmaking) of the contract by the government-the
courts or the Labor Board. Thus, private sector fair representation poses the problem of reconciling governmental intrusion
with a statutory system that was intended to foster private, not
jection to the plan in point of law or policy may be submitted and considered. The decree when made by the Chancellor will represent his
own unfettered judgment. The judicial power has not been delegated
to nonjudicial agencies or to persons or factions interested in the event.
295 U.S. at 70-71. It follows that a substantial Constitutional issue would be
presented if the state were to defend the abrogation of an antecedent contract
right solely upon the ground of approval of "factions interested in the event,"

id. at 71; that is, by delegation of authority to a majority representative under a
public employment collective bargaining law.
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public, determination of terms and conditions of employment.
Accordingly, the duty of fair representation as a limit on the
private sector system of majority rule calls for the most delicate judgment, weighing the nature of the contractual disadvantagement against the degree of intrusion into the system
of private ordering posed by the excision of the offensive term.
In the public sector, however, the determination of employment conditions is necessarily the result of a system of public
ordering. Accordingly, unlike the private employer, the public
employer is constrained by the Constitution. Unless individual
constitutional rights are considered to be dispensable by statutory delegation to a majority representative, such rights impose
limits on the terms reached by collective agreement just as
they impose limits on the rules a governmental employer may
unilaterally adopt.
Curiously, some courts have tended to blur the distinctions
in these respective settings, though to quite opposite effect. In
the private sector, the acceptance of the theory of a rational
decisionmaking process and the expansion of the concept of
reasonableness or rationality as a generalized element of fair
representation, lead inexorably to a denigration of majority
rule and a heightened role for the courts in the review of collective agreements, analogous, perhaps, to judicial review of the
actions of administrative agencies. The ineluctable effect is a
metamorphosis of the system of private ordering from one contemplating a rather circumscribed role for the judiciary into
one more routinely accountable to the judiciary. In the public
sector, on the the other hand, some courts have deemed the
Constitution as dispensable by collective agreement, thereby
allowing government unaccountably to accomplish that which
the fundamental document constitutive of government plainly
forbids it to do. Neither of these lines of decision is faithful to
its respective source and setting.

